Abstract

We study the determinants of asset market fragmentation in a model with strategic investors that disagree about the value of an asset. Investors’ choices determine the market structure. Fragmented markets are supported in equilibrium when disagreement between investors is low. In this case, investors take the same side of the market and are willing to trade in smaller markets with a higher price impact to face less competition when trading against a dealer. The maximum degree of market fragmentation increases as investors’ priors are more correlated. Dealers can benefit from fragmentation, but investors are always better off in centralized markets.

**JEL Classification:** G12, D43, D47

**Keywords:** market fragmentation, disagreement, interdealer trading, price impact, demand schedule equilibrium.
1 Introduction

The structure of financial markets is crucial in determining their efficiency and liquidity. A key aspect of the market structure is the degree of fragmentation, interpreted as the number of venues in which an asset is traded. Under this interpretation, most financial markets are fragmented. The conventional example of fragmented markets are over-the-counter (OTC) markets, in which trading is typically bilateral. However, fragmentation is also prevalent in equity markets. For instance, transactions at the NYSE account only for 25 of the trading volume of its listed assets, with the remaining volume being split over 12 other exchanges and 30 dark pools and other electronic platforms.\footnote{See Rostek and Yoon (2020); Cespa and Vives (forthcoming) and Rostek and Yoon (2020).} In many fragmented markets, participants have market power when they trade, and typically, a few large dealers intermediate a large share of the trading volume. Recently, market fragmentation has sparked the interest of regulators and has put the market structure at the center of recent regulatory discussions and proposals. Still, a fundamental question remains unsettled. What are the determinants of market fragmentation?

To address this question, we develop a model that emphasizes the role of investors in determining the market structure in which an asset is traded. The main insight from our analysis is that market fragmentation arises when there is little disagreement among strategic investors. In our model, investors have market power and disagree about the value of an asset. The value for an investor of trading in a particular market depends on the number of participants in that market and on the disagreement among them. A larger market has a lower cost of trading, since investors face a lower price impact. However, when disagreement is low, all investors trade on the same side of the market against a dealer. In this case, a larger market also increases the competition for the liquidity provided by the dealer. An investor has incentives to trade in a smaller market only when the benefit from a larger share of the gains from trading with the dealer, i.e., when disagreement among investors is low, dominates the increase in trading costs from having a higher price impact. In this case, investors’ choices to trade in smaller markets give rise to fragmented market structures.

Our model has three dates and a finite number of strategic investors and dealers. Investors are ex-ante homogeneous, but ex-post disagree about the value of an asset that is in zero-net supply. The degree of disagreement in the market is captured by the correlation between investors’ priors about the value of the asset. Dealers are homogeneous and do not value the asset intrinsically. Before investors’ priors about the asset value are realized, investors choose a dealer with whom to trade and their choices determine the market structure. After the market structure is decided, trade takes place sequentially. First, each dealer and the investors that chose her trade in a local market. Second, dealers participate in an interdealer market. We model both investors’ and dealers’ trading strategies as quantity-price schedules. When each agent chooses her trading strategy, she understands the impact of her trade on the price (taking all other agents’ strategies as given). Each investor also understands that her choice of dealer affects the market structure. Thus, investors act strategically both when markets form, as well as when they trade.

There are three main assumptions in our model: a) the heterogeneity in priors, b) the timing, and
c) the trading protocol. First, a pervasive feature of financial markets is to have traders trading against each other based on opposing views about the future value of an asset. Both academics and regulators consider disagreement among investors to be an inherent attribute of financial market participants, and frequently track disagreement to gauge the health of the financial system.\(^2\) However, our model is also consistent with other interpretations of heterogeneity in investors’ private valuations based on liquidity needs, the use of the asset as collateral, or risk management constraints.

Second, in our set-up investors choices determine a market structure. This is consistent with end-users who prefer to trade through intermediaries in many asset markets, as argued by Spatt (2017). For example, about 80% of U.S. investment-grade corporate bond trading is initiated by investors who choose dealers from whom to request quotations (see Bessembinder, Spatt and Venkataraman (2020)). Similarly, in swap execution facilities customers typically initiate requests for trade as Riggs et al. (2018) document. Moreover, most dealer intermediated markets have a tiered structure as documented in Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2013) and Li and Schurhoff (2018). For instance, Collin-Dufresne, Junge and Trolle (2018) and Duffie, Scheicher and Vuillemey (2015) find evidence that in the CDS market dealers use interdealer markets to manage inventory risk after trading with clients. In the corporate bond market, interdealer trades account for up to 70% of the total trading volume (see Hollifield, Neklyudov and Spatt (2020)). More generally, as discussed in Bessembinder, Spatt and Venkataraman (2020), many fixed-income securities are traded in two-tiered markets with interdealer trades accounting for a significant amount of total volume. By assuming that trade takes place sequentially, we can study the role of the interdealer market in determining the degree of market fragmentation.

Third, representing agents’ strategies as quantity-price schedules allows us to capture common elements of the increasingly diverse set of trading protocols that are used in practice in decentralized markets. For instance, in the swap markets, customers interested in trade receive indicative quotes from dealers. However, the final terms of trade adjust to reflect the quantity that the customer wishes to trade. More importantly, a common characteristic of most decentralized markets is that a relatively small number of dealers intermediate a vast proportion of transactions and that trading outcomes reflect dealers’ market power relative to other dealers as well as relative to investors (Rostek and Yoon (2020)). By allowing agents to trade strategically in quantity-price schedules, our model reflects these features.

The main insight from our paper is that a fragmented market structure is an equilibrium when disagreement among investors is low. When choosing to trade in a larger market, investors benefit from a lower price impact but potentially have lower gains from trade with the dealer. The gains from trading with a dealer in a larger market depend on the correlation between investors’ priors. When disagreement is low, investors take similar positions against the dealer. This increases the competition among investors, which allows the dealer to exploit her position in the market better. In consequence, the investors’ gains from trading with the dealer decrease. The decrease in gains from trade with a dealer in a larger market dominates any improvement in the price impact when investor priors are sufficiently correlated. In this case, market fragmentation is sustained in equilibrium.

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\(^2\)See Hong and Stein (2007) for a survey on the topic.
Even though the investors’ choices determine the market structure, the dealers’ strategic behavior in the interdealer market is crucial for supporting market fragmentation. We show this by studying two limiting cases of our baseline model: the case of no interdealer market and the case in which the interdealer market is perfectly competitive. To begin with, we show that fragmentation arises in equilibrium even in the absence of an interdealer market when disagreement among investors is low. In addition, we show that fragmentation unravels as the interdealer market becomes perfectly competitive. These polar cases show that the dealers’ strategic trading behavior is necessary for market fragmentation to arise. Moreover, we study an extension of our model with dealer entry to examine the maximum degree of fragmentation that can be supported in equilibrium, and find that it is decreasing in the disagreement among investors.

Moreover, we use our model to explore the implications of market fragmentation and disagreement on liquidity and welfare. Our results are consistent with the intuition that assets that are traded in fragmented markets have intrinsically low liquidity, as proxied a by a high correlation between investors’ priors. However, a fragmented market structure itself further contributes to lowering the traded volume. Indeed, trading volume is lower in fragmented markets than in centralized ones keeping the degree of disagreement among investors constant. We analyze investor and dealer welfare when they trade in a fragmented market and compare it to the welfare they would attain if they were to trade in a centralized market. We show that although dealers benefit from trading in a fragmented market provided investors disagreement is high enough, investors are always better off trading in a centralized market. Thus, trading in a fragmented market can be inefficient.

Lastly, we extend our model to allow for learning from prices. The principal difference with the main set-up is that dealers do not observe the aggregate market sentiment and can only infer it from prices. We find that a fragmented market structure can still be supported in equilibrium. However, learning from prices weakens investors’ incentives to trade in fragmented markets. Although investors face the same trade-off between a lower price impact in a larger local market versus lower expected gains of trading with the dealer, the decrease in gains from trading with the dealer is lower when dealers learn from prices. This implies that the increase in competition among investors is lower when dealers have imperfect information and either a higher correlation in investor valuations or fewer active dealers are needed to support a symmetric fragmented market structure.

In practice, the mechanism we present in this paper interacts with other characteristics associated with fragmented markets, such as asymmetric information, search frictions, or execution fees. However, by focusing on investors’ incentives, our approach brings a novel perspective that complements other theories that seek to explain market fragmentation through the lens of trading services providers, such as dealers, exchanges, and other trading platforms.

**Literature Review**

This paper relates to several strands of literature. The more relevant studies are those on endogenous market structure and intermediation in decentralized markets.

A series of papers have developed models where the market structure in which assets are traded is endogenously determined. Most of these works emphasize the role of trading services providers,
focusing on transaction costs or fees charged by exchanges, or on the competition between venues as potential explanations for market fragmentation. An early contribution is Pagano (1989) who studies a set-up in which traders can choose to enter one of two exchanges in which the same asset is traded. In Rust and Hall (2003) buyers and sellers choose between trading with a market maker at publicly observable bid and ask prices, or with middlemen at privately observed quote prices. In both models, traders concentrate in one market in the absence of fees or transaction costs. In contrast, in our model markets fragmentation arises in equilibrium even when there are no fees or exogenous trading costs.

A related set of papers studies competition between venues. In Pagnotta and Philippon (2018) when two venues compete in the speed with which traders can find counterparties, markets fragmentation arises. Competition also plays a role in segmenting markets in Lester, Rocheteau and Weill (2015), as dealers compete to attract order flow by posting the terms at which they execute trades. Baldauf and Mollner (2019), Cespa and Vives (forthcoming), and Chao, Yao and Ye (2019) propose models in which exchanges compete in the fees charged for trading services and evaluate the impact of fragmentation on market quality. We abstract from competition between venues. Instead, in our model investors choose a dealer with whom to trade based on the size of her local market, which is, in turn, determined by the other investors’ choices.

The market structure has also been linked to informational asymmetries. For instance, in Zhu (2014) exchanges attract informed traders who want a fast execution of their order, while uninformed traders, who only have idiosyncratic liquidity needs, trade in dark pools. In contrast, in Kawakami (2017) trading in multiple venues is optimal to avoid excessive information aggregation as revealed risk cannot be traded away. Most recently, Lee and Wang (2018) propose a model in which informed investors trade in exchanges and uninformed hedgers select themselves to trade in OTC markets as dealers are able to attract them with targeted quotes. In our baseline model, there are no information asymmetries, and market fragmentation is driven by the investors’ disagreement about the asset value.

Recently, Dugast, Weill and Uslu (2019) explore how heterogeneity in investors’ types affects the market structure in which trade occurs. Their model trades off risk sharing and earning intermediation profits. When the latter force dominates, trade takes place in decentralized, over-the-counter markets. In our paper, investors choosing to trade in a fragmented market trade off lower competition for the liquidity in the market, as proxied by the gains from trade with a dealer, and a higher price of that liquidity, as proxied by their price impact. When the former force dominates, trade takes place in fragmented markets.

Some recent papers explore the efficiency of trade in different market structures. In Malamud and Rostek (2017) agents, who take into account their price impact, may benefit from trading in interconnected venues relative to a centralized market. Similarly, in Manzano and Vives (forthcoming), trading in segmented markets may be beneficial to privately-informed investors that trade strategically.

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3 In Rust and Hall (2003) consumers and producers are indifferent between trading against a single middleman (concentration), or against a middleman and the market maker (fragmentation) at the Walrasian price.

4 Although not directly concerned with studying market fragmentation, some other papers analyze models of competition between venues. These studies include Biais (1993), Glosten (1994), Hendershott and Mendelson (2000), Parlour and Seppi (2003), and Santos and Scheinkman (2001).
Duffie and Wang (2016) show that OTC markets can be efficient if agents write contingent bilateral contracts. Glode and Opp (2020) illustrate that a market in which agents face costly trading delays can be more efficient than a centralized market in which trade occurs without delays. In contrast to our paper, these models take the market structure as given while we focus on endogeneizing the market structure.

There is a growing literature that studies the role of intermediaries in decentralized markets. Hugonnier, Lester and Weill (2015), Neklyudov (2014), and Chang and Zhang (2016) propose models in which intermediaries facilitate trade between counterparties that otherwise would need to wait a long time to trade. Other papers explore the informational role of intermediaries. In Glode and Opp (2016) the role of intermediaries is to restore efficient trading by reducing adverse selection, while in Boyarchenko, Lucca and Veldkamp (2016) interdealer information sharing improves risk sharing and welfare. Our model complements these works by highlighting the intermediaries’ strategic trading behavior as a key determinant of market fragmentation.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. In Section 3, we define and characterize the equilibrium of the model when markets are fragmented. In Section 4 we investigate the role of interdealer trading in determining the degree of market fragmentation. We analyze the welfare and liquidity properties in fragmented markets relative to centralized markets in Section 5. Section 6 extends the baseline model to allow for learning from prices. Finally, we conclude in Section 7. All omitted proofs are in the Appendix.

2 The model

There are three dates, $t = 0, 1, 2$, and a finite number of agents that trade a risky asset in zero-net supply. There are two types of agents, dealers and investors. There are $n_D \geq 3$ dealers indexed by $\ell = 1, \ldots, n_D$. We denote by $N_D$ the set of dealers. The utility of a dealer who holds $x$ units of the asset at time date 2 is given by

$$U_D(x) = -\frac{\gamma}{2}x^2.$$  

For tractability, we implicitly normalize the dealers’ intrinsic value for the asset to zero.

There are also $n_I = n_S \cdot n_D$ investors indexed by $i = 1, \ldots, n_I$, where $n_S$ is an integer and $n_S \geq 3$. The set of investors is denoted by $N_I$. An investor $i$ derives utility

$$U_I(x) = \bar{\theta}x - \frac{\gamma}{2}x^2$$

from holding $x$ units of the asset at time 2. $\bar{\theta}$ represents the value of the asset for an investor, which is random and is realized at date 2. The quadratic term in the utility functions for dealers and investors can be interpreted as the cost of holding the asset.

Investors disagree about the value of the asset. At date 1, investors have heterogeneous priors about $\theta$ given by

$$\bar{\theta} \sim_i N \left( \theta^i, \sigma^2_\theta \right),$$

where
with $\theta \sim N(0, \sigma_\theta^2)$, $\eta^i \overset{iid}{\sim} N(0, \sigma_\eta^2)$, and $\theta \perp \eta^i$. Investors’ priors over the value of the asset have a common component $\theta$, which can be interpreted as the market sentiment for the asset, and an idiosyncratic component $\eta^i$ that governs the heterogeneity in beliefs. Both components of the investors’ valuations are realized at date 1. The market sentiment $\theta$ is observed by all agents when it is realized, while the idiosyncratic component $\eta^i$ is private information of investor $i$. Investors take their priors as given and do not learn from the price since they observe $\theta$.\footnote{Heterogeneous beliefs are featured in a large literature following De Long et al. (1990) and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). Our formulation using heterogeneous priors is closest to Dávila and Parlatore (forthcoming).}

We adopt this information structure in the baseline model to focus on the agents’ strategic trading behavior as a driver of market fragmentation. In Section 6 we extend our analysis to consider the case in which there is learning from prices.

The degree of disagreement among investors is given by the dispersion in the idiosyncratic component of priors, $\sigma_\eta^2$. When $\sigma_\eta^2 = 0$, there is no disagreement and investors have common priors. When $\sigma_\eta^2 \to \infty$ disagreement is maximal. It is helpful to map the degree of disagreement among investors to the correlation in their priors. In the remainder of the paper we will measure the extent to which investors disagree about the value of the asset by $1 - \rho$, where

$$\rho \equiv \text{Corr}(\theta^i, \theta^j) = \frac{\sigma_\theta^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\eta^2} \quad \forall i, j \in N_l, i \neq j.$$ 

When $\sigma_\eta^2 = 0$, the heterogeneity among investors vanishes and $\rho = 1$. When disagreement is maximal $\sigma_\eta^2 \to \infty$, which implies $\rho = 0$.\footnote{The heterogeneity in investors’ priors leads to heterogeneous perceived valuations which can also be attributed to differences in liquidity needs, in the use of the asset as collateral, in risk management constraints. While these factors may play a role in dealers valuation for an asset, we consider that heterogeneity across dealers is relatively less marked than across investors.}

Figure 1 illustrates the timing of the model. Before any heterogeneity among investors is realized, the structure of the market is determined by the investors’ choices. At date 0, each investor chooses a dealer with whom to trade. An investor can choose at most one dealer. However, multiple investors can choose the same dealer.\footnote{Trade in many markets relies on relationships that are very concentrated. Hendershott et al. (2020) document that an investor in the corporate bond market trades on average with six dealers over the course of more than a decade.} Once investors make their dealer selection, markets open and trade takes place in two rounds. At date 1, each dealer $\ell$ trades with the investors that chose her at date $t=1$ and then trades with the local market $p_1^\ell$. Then, an interdealer market $p_2$ opens, and each dealer $\ell$ faces a second choice of which investor to trade with.
0, in a local market $\ell$. At date 2, dealers trade in an interdealer market. There is a finite number of participants in the local markets and in the interdealer market. Hence, all market participants act strategically and take into account their price impact when making their trading decisions.

The investors’ choices at date 0 determine a market structure, $m$, in which each dealer $\ell$ interacts with $n_{\ell} \geq 2$ investors. When an investor $i$ chooses a dealer $\ell$, we say that $i \ell \in m$. We denote by $N_I(\ell)$ the set of investors that choose dealer $\ell$. A fragmented market structure exists when there are at least three local markets each with $n_{\ell} \geq 2$ investors. A fragmented market is symmetric when in each local market $\ell$ there is the same number of investors $n_S$. We denote by $m_{n_S}$ a symmetric fragmented market. Figure 2 illustrates a symmetric fragmented market structure.

Dealers and investors submit quantity-price schedules when trading, as in Kyle (1989) and Vives (2011). Each investor $i$ with a prior $\theta^i$ submits a demand function $X^i_1$, which maps each price $p^\ell_1$ in the local market $\ell$, into a quantity $x^i_1$ she wishes to trade

$$X^i_1(p^\ell_1; \theta^i) = x^i_1.$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

When trading in local market $\ell$ at date 1, the demand function of a dealer $\ell$ who observes $\theta$, is a function $Q^\ell_1$ which maps each price $p^\ell_1$ in the local market $\ell$ into a quantity $q^\ell_1$ she wishes to trade

$$Q^\ell_1(p^\ell_1; \theta) = q^\ell_1.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

At date 2, a dealer $\ell$ who observed $\theta$ and acquired $q^\ell_1$ units of the asset in the local market submits a demand function $Q^\ell_2$ that maps each possible price in the interdealer market, $p_2$, into a quantity $q^\ell_2$ she wishes to trade

$$Q^\ell_2(p_2; \theta, q^\ell_1) = q^\ell_2.$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

Finally, given a market structure $m$, the expected payoff for an investor $i$ at date 0, when the demands submitted by the dealers and investors are $\{X^i_1, Q^\ell_1, Q^\ell_2\}_{i \in N_I, \ell \in N_D}$ is

$$V^i_1(m) = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \theta^i X^i_1(p^\ell_1; \theta^i) - \frac{\gamma}{2} \left( X^i_1(p^\ell_1; \theta^i) \right)^2 - X^i_1(p^\ell_1; \theta^i) p^\ell_1 \right],$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)
where \( p^1_\ell \) is the price at which local market \( \ell \) clears, i.e., \( p^1_\ell \) is such that

\[
Q^1_{\ell} \left( p^1_\ell; \theta \right) + \sum_{i \in N_I(\ell)} X^i_1 \left( p^1_\ell; \theta^i \right) = 0, \quad \ell \in N_D. \tag{5}
\]

Similarly, the expected payoff of a dealer \( \ell \) at date 0 is

\[
V^\ell_1 (m) = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ -\frac{\gamma}{2} \left( Q^\ell_1 \left( p^1_\ell; \theta \right) + Q^\ell_2 \left( p^2_2; \theta, q^\ell_1 \right) \right)^2 - Q^\ell_2 \left( p^2_2; \theta, q^\ell_1 \right) \cdot p^2_2 - Q^\ell_1 \left( p^1_\ell; \theta \right) \cdot p^1_\ell \right], \tag{6}
\]

where \( p^2_2 \) is the price at which the interdealer market clears

\[
\sum_{\ell \in N_D} Q^\ell_2 \left( p^2_2; \theta, q^\ell_1 \right) = 0. \tag{7}
\]

### 3 Equilibrium

In this section, we define and characterize the equilibrium of the model. We start by computing the equilibrium in the interdealer market at date 2 taking as given a market structure \( m \) and the dealers’ choices in their local markets at date 1. Then, we characterize the equilibrium in the local market given a market structure \( m \). Lastly, we look at the equilibrium conditions in the market formation game which determines the equilibrium market structure, \( m \). All omitted proofs are in the Appendix.

**Definition 1. (Equilibrium)** An equilibrium is a market structure \( m \) and demand functions \( \{ Q^\ell_1, Q^\ell_2 \}_{\ell \in N_D} \) for dealers and \( \{ X^i_1 \}_{i \in N_I} \) for investors such that given the pricing functions in Equation (5) and Equation (7)

1. \( Q^\ell_2 \) solves each dealer \( \ell \)'s problem in the interdealer market at date 2

\[
\max_{Q^\ell_2} \left[ -\frac{\gamma}{2} \left( q^\ell_1 + Q^\ell_2 \right)^2 - p^2 Q^\ell_2 \right] \tag{8}
\]

taking as given the other dealers’ demand functions in the interdealer market \( \{ Q^l_2 \}_{l \in N_D, l \neq \ell} \);

2. \( Q^\ell_1 \) solves each dealer \( \ell \)'s problem in her local market at date 1

\[
\max_{Q^\ell_1} \mathbb{E}_1 \left[ -\frac{\gamma}{2} \left( Q^\ell_1 + Q^\ell_2 \left( p^2_2; \theta, Q^\ell_1 \right) \right)^2 - p^2 Q^\ell_2 \left( p^2_2; \theta, Q^\ell_1 \right) \right] - p^1_\ell Q^\ell_1 \tag{9}
\]

taking as given investors’ demand function in local market \( \ell \) \( \{ X^i_1 \}_{i \in N_I(\ell)} \);

3. \( X^i_1 \) solves each investor \( i \)'s problem in the local market at date 1

\[
\max_{X^i_1} \left[ \theta^i X^i_1 - \frac{\gamma}{2} \left( X^i_1 \right)^2 - p^1_\ell X^i_1 \right] \tag{10}
\]

taking as given dealer \( \ell \)'s and the other investors’ demand functions in local market \( \ell \), \( Q^\ell_1 \) and \( \{ X^j_1 \}_{j \in N_I(\ell), j \neq i} \), respectively; and
4. no investor \( i \) in local market \( \ell \) benefits from deviating and joining a different local market \( \ell' \neq \ell \), for all \( \ell, \ell' \in N_D \), i.e., the expected payoff an investor receives from deviating to the market structure \( (m - i\ell + i\ell') \) is not larger than the expected payoff she obtains in the market structure \( m \), for any \( \ell' \neq \ell \),

\[
V^i_1 (m - i\ell + i\ell') \leq V^i_1 (m) \quad \forall i \in N_I(\ell), \forall \ell \in N_D.
\] (11)

Our notion for the equilibrium market structure, described in condition 11 in Definition 1, is related to the concept of pairwise stability introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Since there is a finite number of agents, all agents trade strategically and take into account their price impact when submitting their demand. For the same reason, when an investor evaluates the benefit of leaving the local market \( \ell \) and joining the local market \( \ell' \), she understands that trading outcomes in the market structure \( m - i\ell + i\ell' \) are different than in the market structure \( m \). To keep our analysis tractable, we restrict our attention to equilibria in which the market structure is symmetric and agents have linear trading strategies. We discuss the existence of asymmetric market structures in equilibrium at the end of this section.

3.1 Interdealer market

At date 2, after each dealer trades with the investors that chose her, the interdealer market opens. A dealer \( \ell \) enters the interdealer market with an inventory \( q^\ell_1 \) of the asset, which she acquired in local market \( \ell \). In the interdealer market, dealers choose their trading strategies taking as given the other dealers’ demand functions, as well as the distribution of their inventories acquired at date 1.

As it is usual in demand submission games, we simplify the optimization problem in Equation (8), which is defined over a function space, to finding the functions \( Q^\ell_2 (p_2; \theta, q^\ell_1) \) point-wise. To do this, we fix the realization of the set of idiosyncratic shocks to priors \( \{\eta^i\}_{i \in N_I} \). This maps into a realization of inventories \( \{q^\ell_1\}_{\ell \in N_D} \) that dealers bring to the interdealer market. Then, we solve for the optimal quantity that dealer \( \ell \) demands in the interdealer market as she takes as given the demand functions of the other dealers. This procedure allows us to derive the optimal demand function of dealer \( \ell \) point by point. We follow this approach below.

The first order condition for dealer \( \ell \) is

\[
\gamma \left( q^\ell_1 + q^\ell_2 \right) + p_2 + \frac{\partial p_{2,-\ell}}{\partial q^\ell_2} q^\ell_2 = 0,
\] (12)

where \( p_{2,-\ell} \) is the inverse residual demand of dealer \( \ell \) implied by

\[
\sum_{\ell \in N_D, \ell \neq \ell} Q^\ell_2 (p_2; \theta, q^\ell_1) + q^\ell_2 = 0.
\]

Since holding the asset has no intrinsic value for dealers, each dealer \( \ell \) chooses \( q^\ell_2 \) to minimize her cost of holding the asset, net of any cash transfers in the interdealer market. The first two terms on the left-hand side of Equation (12) represent the direct costs of demanding an additional unit of the asset in the interdealer market. The first term represents the marginal increase in the holding cost whereas
the second term is the cost of purchasing an additional unit of the asset. Since the interdealer market is strategic, there is an additional, indirect cost of increasing the quantity demanded: the impact this quantity has on the market clearing price. The third term in the first order condition for dealers captures this indirect cost. The following proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the interdealer market.

**Proposition 1. (Existence and Uniqueness)** Given a market structure $m$ and inventories \( \{q_{1\ell}\}_{\ell \in N_D} \), there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies in the interdealer market.

The equilibrium in the interdealer market is straightforward. The first order condition in Equation (12) implies that the demand function of a dealer $\ell$ is

\[
Q_2^\ell \left( p_2; \theta, q_{1\ell} \right) = -\frac{1}{\gamma + \lambda_2^\ell} \left( \gamma q_{1\ell} + p_2 \right),
\]

where $\lambda_2^\ell \equiv \frac{\partial p_2}{\partial q_2^\ell}$ is dealer $\ell$’s price impact in the interdealer market. Market clearing in the interdealer market implies that the equilibrium price $p_2$ is given by

\[
p_2 = -\gamma \frac{\sum_{\ell \in N_D} q_{1\ell}}{n_D}.
\]

From Equation (13) and Equation (14) it follows that the equilibrium quantity traded by dealer $\ell$ when the dealers’ inventories are $\{q_{1\ell}\}_{\ell \in N_D}$ is

\[
q_2^\ell = \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + \lambda_2^\ell} \left( \frac{\sum_{\ell \in N_D} q_{1\ell}}{n_D} - q_{1\ell} \right).
\]

A dealer trades in the interdealer market to off-load some of her inventory as she faces quadratic holding costs. The interdealer market allows dealers to smooth idiosyncratic shocks they face in local markets. The term between parenthesis in Equation (15) captures the gains from trading in the interdealer market for an individual dealer. The larger the difference between the average inventory in the market and an individual dealer’s inventory, the larger the amount the individual dealer will trade. If all dealers hold the same amount of inventory at the beginning of date 2, there are no gains from trading in the interdealer market.

However, even when there is scope for off-loading inventories, a dealer restricts her trade because she has an impact on the price. As the first term in Equation (15) shows, a larger price impact $\lambda_2^\ell$ makes dealers less willing to trade. The price impact captures how strategic the interdealer market is and it depends on the market structure only through the number of dealers participating in the market. The larger the number of dealers in the interdealer market, the less strategic (the deeper) the interdealer market is, and the lower the price impact of each dealer. Therefore, for a given level of heterogeneity in inventories, dealers will trade more in deeper markets. As $n_D \to \infty$, and the market becomes perfectly competitive, all dealers hold the same amount of the asset at the end of period 2 irrespective of their inventory choice at date 1. In this case, dealers can share the idiosyncratic shocks they face in the local markets perfectly.
3.2 Local markets

At date 1, after each investor chooses a dealer with whom to trade and all idiosyncratic priors are realized, strategic local (investor-dealer) markets open. Each market \( \ell \) is comprised of dealer \( \ell \) and the \( n^\ell \) investors who chose to trade with her. Each of these market participants chooses her demand optimally taking the other participants’ demands as given. As in the interdealer market, we solve for the demand functions that solve the optimization problems in Equation (10) for investors and Equation (9) for dealers point-wise.

**Investors.** The first order condition for an investor \( i \) in local market \( \ell \) is

\[
\theta^i - p^\ell_{1,i} - \gamma x^i_1 - \frac{\partial p^\ell_{1,-i}}{\partial x^i_1} x^i_1 = 0,
\]

where \( p^\ell_{1,-i} \) is the inverse residual demand function for investor \( i \) implied by

\[
\sum_{j \in N_I(\ell), j \neq i} X^j_1 \left( p^\ell_{1,-i}; \theta^j \right) + x^i_1 + Q^1_1 \left( p^\ell_{1,-i}; \theta \right) = 0.
\]

Each investor \( i \) demands a quantity \( x^i_1 \) so that her marginal utility equalizes her marginal cost of trading. The first term in Equation (16) is the marginal benefit of increasing the final asset holdings for an investor \( i \), which is given by her prior \( \theta^i \). The following three terms in Equation (16) represent investor \( i \)'s marginal cost of increasing her demand. The second and third terms represent the price the investor pays to acquire an additional unit of the asset and the marginal increase in her holding costs, respectively. The last term is investor \( i \)'s price impact, which captures the cost of trading in a strategic market.

**Dealer.** The first order condition for dealer \( \ell \) in the local market is

\[
\frac{dV^\ell_2 \left( q^\ell_1 \right)}{dq^\ell_1} - p^\ell_1 - \frac{\partial p^\ell_{1,-\ell}}{\partial q^\ell_1} q^\ell_1 = 0,
\]

where \( V^\ell_2 \left( q^\ell_1 \right) \) represents the payoff that dealer \( \ell \) expects to receive in the interdealer market given by

\[
V^\ell_2 \left( q^\ell_1 \right) = E_1 \left[ -\frac{\gamma}{2} \left( Q^2_2 \left( p_2; \theta, q^\ell_1 \right) + q^\ell_1 \right)^2 - p_2 Q^2_2 \left( p_2; \theta, q^\ell_1 \right) \right],
\]

where \( p_2 \) is the equilibrium price and \( q^\ell_2 \) is the equilibrium quantity traded by dealer \( \ell \) in the interdealer market.

Since all agents are strategic, each dealer \( \ell \) takes into account the effect of her trade on the inverse residual demand function, \( p^\ell_{1,-\ell} \), in her local market which is implied by

\[
\sum_{j \in N_I(\ell)} X^j_1 \left( p^\ell_{1,-\ell}; \theta^j \right) + q^\ell_1 = 0.
\]

Analogous to the investor’s problem, dealer \( \ell \) will demand a quantity \( q^\ell_1 \) to equalize the marginal benefit and the marginal cost associated with increasing the quantity demanded. Dealers do not attach any intrinsic value to the asset. However, since dealers can access both the local and interdealer markets, they can benefit from the price differences across both markets. The first term in Equation
is the expected marginal benefit of increasing the quantity that the dealer acquires in the local market, which is given by the dealer’s expected value of increasing her inventory in the interdealer market. The second term captures the pecuniary cost of increasing \( q_1^\ell \) by one unit and the third term captures the cost of trading in strategic markets, measured by the dealer’s price impact. The next proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the local markets.

**Proposition 2. (Existence and uniqueness)** Given a market structure \( m \), there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies at date 1.

To compute the equilibrium at date 1, we derive the equilibrium trading strategies of the investors and the dealer in each local market \( \ell \). The first-order condition in Equation (16) implies that the demand function of an investor \( i \) in local market \( \ell \) is

\[
X_i^\ell \left( p_i^\ell, \theta_i \right) = \frac{\theta_i - p_i^\ell}{\gamma + \nu_i^\ell},
\]

where \( \nu_i^\ell \equiv \frac{\partial p_i^\ell}{\partial q_i^\ell} \) is investor \( i \)'s price impact in local market \( \ell \). Similarly, the first-order condition for dealer \( \ell \) in her local market in Equation (17) implies that the demand function of the dealer \( \ell \) is

\[
Q_\ell^\ell \left( p_\ell^\ell; \theta \right) = \frac{1}{\lambda_\ell^\ell} \left( \frac{dV^\ell}{dq_1^\ell} \left( q_1^\ell \right) - p_\ell^\ell \right),
\]

where \( \lambda_\ell^\ell \equiv \frac{\partial p_\ell^\ell}{\partial q_\ell} \) represents dealer \( \ell \)'s price impact in her local market. The quantity that an agent trades in a local market is proportional to her perceived marginal gain of holding the asset, which is given by the difference between her expected marginal valuation for the asset at date 1 and the price of the asset in the local market. An investor’s marginal valuation is simply her prior \( \theta_i \), while a dealer’s marginal valuation for the asset is given by her expected payoff from bringing an additional unit of the asset to the interdealer market, \( dV^\ell_{\ell}/dq_1^\ell \). As in the interdealer market, the price impact in the local market restricts the amount traded by dealers and investors. The following lemma characterizes the investors’ and dealer’s equilibrium price impact in the local market.

**Lemma 1. (Equilibrium price impacts)** In each local market \( \ell \), the investors’ and the dealer’s equilibrium price impact satisfy the following system of equations

\[
\nu_i^\ell = \frac{1}{\lambda_i^\ell + \gamma} + \frac{1}{\gamma + \lambda_i^\ell} \quad \text{and} \quad \lambda_\ell^\ell = \frac{\gamma + \nu_\ell^\ell}{n_\ell^\ell}.
\]

where \( \lambda_\ell^\ell = \frac{\gamma}{nD - 2} \). Moreover, the price impacts satisfy the following properties

\[a) \frac{\partial \nu_\ell^\ell}{\partial n_\ell^\ell} < 0, \quad b) \frac{\partial \lambda_i^\ell}{\partial n_\ell^\ell} < 0, \quad c) \frac{\partial \nu_i^\ell}{\partial n_D} < 0, \quad \text{and} \quad d) \frac{\partial \lambda_\ell^\ell}{\partial n_D} < 0.\]

Lemma 1 shows that investors and dealers trade more aggressively when local markets are larger, and when the interdealer market is less strategic (i.e., deeper). As it is usual in models of strategic trading, the larger the number of investors in the local market, the lower the price impact of a market participant and the more investors and dealers react to the price. When the interdealer market is less
strategic, it is less costly for the dealer to unload her inventory at date 2, which makes the dealer trade more aggressively in her local market. In turn, the dealer’s lower sensitivity to the price implies that investors face a flatter inverse residual demand and have a lower price impact.

Using Equation (21) in Lemma 1 and the definition of $\lambda_2$, it can be seen that the price impact in local market $\ell$ for the investors, $\nu_\ell^1$, and for the dealer, $\lambda_\ell^1$, depend on the market structure $m$ only through the number of dealers participating in the interdealer market, $n_D$, and the number of investors in the local market $\ell$, $n_\ell$, but not through the number of investors in other local markets.

The demands of investors and dealers depend on the structure of the market in different ways. The investors’ equilibrium demand functions depend on the market structure $m$ only through an investor’s price impact $\nu_\ell^1$, as can be seen from Equation (19). The dealer’s equilibrium demand function in her local market in Equation (20) depends on the market structure through her price impact $\lambda_\ell^1$, as well as through the dealer’s valuation for the asset in her local market, as given by the marginal value of bringing an additional unit to the interdealer market $\frac{dV_\ell^2}{dq_\ell^1}$. The dealer’s price impact determines the slope of the dealer’s inverse demand while her valuation determines its intercept.

The dealer’s valuation for the asset in her local market depends on the market structure through her price impact in the local market and through the equilibrium in the interdealer market. More specifically, the dealer’s marginal valuation of the asset depends on the gains from trade she expects to attain in the interdealer market, which depend on number of dealers and on the distribution of investors across local markets. Differentiating $V_\ell^2$, using Equation (12) and substituting in dealer $\ell$’s demand function in Equation (20), as well the price in the local market in Equation (26), we obtain that the dealer’s expected marginal valuation for the asset at date 1 is given by

$$\frac{dV_\ell^2(q_\ell)}{dq_\ell} = w^\ell \frac{\sum_{i \in N_I(\ell)} \theta_i}{n_\ell} + \left(1 - w^\ell\right) \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + \lambda_2} \mathbb{E}[p_2 | \theta, p_1^\ell],$$

(22)

where the weight $w^\ell$ is given by

$$w^\ell = \frac{\gamma \lambda_2}{\gamma (2 \lambda_1^1 + \lambda_2^2) + 2 \lambda_1^1 \lambda_2^2}.$$

As one can see from Equation (22), dealer $\ell$’s marginal valuation of the asset has two components. The first component, $\frac{\sum_{i \in N_I(\ell)} \theta_i}{n_\ell}$, represents the benefit from trading with the investors in her local market, while the second component, $\frac{\gamma}{\gamma + \lambda_2^2} \mathbb{E}[p_2 | \theta, p_1^\ell]$, is the benefit from trading in the interdealer market. The weight the dealer attaches to these two components depends on her price impacts in the local and interdealer markets. When the dealer’s price impact in the local market $\lambda_1^1$ increases, the dealer weighs the gains from trade in the local market less in her marginal valuation of the asset, i.e., $w^\ell$ decreases. Analogously, when the dealer’s price impact in the interdealer market $\lambda_2^2$ increases, the dealer weighs the gains from trade in the interdealer market less in her marginal valuation of the asset, i.e., $w^\ell$ increases. If trading in the interdealer market is perfectly competitive and $\lambda_2^2 = 0$, the dealer only cares about her trades in the interdealer market and $w^\ell = 0$.

The expected price at date 2 is determined by the extent of the opportunities to re-trade among dealers in the interdealer market, which depends on the market structure. More specifically, dealer $\ell$
expects the price in the interdealer market to be

$$
\mathbb{E}_\pi\left[p_2|\theta, q^*_1\right] = -\frac{\gamma}{n_D} \left( q^*_1 + \sum_{l \in N_D, l \neq \ell} \mathbb{E}_\pi\left[q^*_1|\theta\right] \right).
$$

(23)

The expected price in Equation (23) depends on dealer $\ell$’s trade in her local market and on all the other dealers’ expected trades in their local markets, which, in turn, depend on the conditions in their local markets. Therefore, the market structure affects dealer $\ell$’s valuation for the asset beyond the conditions in local market $\ell$.

All the equilibrium outcomes at dates 1 and 2 are conditional on the market structure $m$. Similarly, the payoffs of investors and dealers depend on the correlation among investors’ priors, $\rho$. So far, we have omitted the dependence on these objects to simplify the notation. In the next section, we make this dependence explicit at times to highlight the trade-offs faced by investors when choosing a dealer with whom to trade.

### 3.3 Market Formation

At date 0, before any uncertainty is realized, each investor $i$ chooses a dealer with whom to trade. Since each investor $i$ takes the other investors’ choices as given, from investor $i$’s perspective, choosing a dealer with whom to trade is the same as choosing between two market structures.

The expected utility of an investor of participating in a local market with $n^\ell$ investors when the market structure is $m$ is given by

$$
V^i_1(m) = \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} + \nu^\ell_i \right) \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ (x^i_1)^2 \right] = \frac{\gamma + \nu^\ell_i}{(\gamma + \nu^\ell_i)^2} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \left( \theta^i - p^\ell_i(m, \theta) \right)^2 \right],
$$

(24)

where $\nu^\ell_i$ and $p^\ell_i(m, \theta)$ are, respectively, the price impact and the equilibrium price in local market $\ell$ when the aggregate component of the priors is $\theta$ and the market structure is $m$.

For a symmetric fragmented market to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that no investor wants to deviate from her local market to a larger one. Formally, a symmetric fragmented market structure $m_{n_S}$ can be supported in equilibrium if

$$
\Delta^i(\rho; n_D) \equiv V^i_1(m_{n_S}) - V^i_1(m_{n_S} - i \ell + i \ell') > 0, \quad \forall i \in N_I, \forall \ell' \neq \ell, \forall \ell, \ell' \in N_D,
$$

(25)

where $\Delta^i(\rho; n_D)$ represents the marginal benefit for investor $i$ of participating in symmetric market structure, $m_{n_S}$, relative to participating in market structure $(m_{n_S} - i \ell + i \ell')$, when the correlation across investor priors is $\rho$ and when there are $n_D$ dealers. When choosing a dealer, an investor weighs the benefit of trading in a local market $\ell$ against one dealer and other $n_S - 1$ investors, against the benefit of trading in a local market $\ell'$ against one dealer and other $n_S$ investors, while taking into account the effect of each market structure on the equilibrium in the interdealer market and on the dealers’ behavior in the local markets.

Equation (24) shows that there are two ways through which the market structure $m$ affects the investors’ expected utility. First, the number of investors in the local market determines the price impact she will face in her local market (see Lemma 1). Second, the price at which an investor expects
to trade in the local market depends on the whole market structure. To see this, note that substituting the investors’ and dealer’s demand functions, respectively in Equation (19) and Equation (20), into the market clearing condition in Equation (5), and using the expression for the dealer’s price impact in Equation (21), the price in the local market can be written as

\[
p_1^\ell (m, \theta) = \frac{n^\ell}{\gamma + \nu^\ell} + \frac{1}{\lambda_1^\ell} \sum_{j \in N_1(\ell)} \theta^j + \frac{1}{\lambda_1^\ell} \frac{dV_2^\ell (q_1^\ell, m)}{dq_1^\ell} = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\sum_{j \in N_1(\ell)} \theta^j}{n^\ell} + \frac{dV_2^\ell (q_1^\ell, m)}{dq_1^\ell} \right). \tag{26}
\]

Equation (26) shows that the equilibrium price in the local market is a weighted average of each market participant’s marginal valuation, where each weight is given by the relative slopes of an agent’s demand function and the aggregate demand. Everything else equal, when the price impact of an agent increases, her demand becomes less responsive to the price. In consequence, the agent’s marginal valuation puts less weight on the equilibrium price. Using Lemma 1 one can see that the dealer’s demand is as elastic as the aggregate demand of investors and, hence the equilibrium price in the local market is an average of the investors’ average priors, \( \frac{\sum_{j \in N_1(\ell)} \theta^j}{n^\ell} \), and the dealer’s valuation of the asset, \( \frac{dV_2^\ell}{dq_1^\ell} \). From the characterization of the equilibrium in the local market, we know that a dealer’s valuation for the asset at date 1 depends on the equilibrium in the interdealer market, which in turn depends on the distribution of investors across dealers.

Using the expression for the equilibrium price in the local market in Equation (26) in Equation (24) we have that the expected utility of an investors of participating in a local market \( \ell \) when the market structure is \( m \) can be written as

\[
V_i^1 (m) = \frac{\gamma^\ell + \nu^\ell}{(\gamma + \nu^\ell)^2} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \frac{1}{2} \left( \theta^i - \frac{\sum_{j \in N_1(\ell)} \theta^j}{n^\ell} \right)^2 + \frac{1}{2} \left( \theta^i - \frac{dV_2^\ell (q_1^\ell, m)}{dq_1^\ell} \right)^2 \right]. \tag{27}
\]

The first term in the investor’s expected utility captures the cost of trading in a strategic market. Intuitively, everything else equal, an investor’s expected utility is higher when her price impact in the local market, \( \nu^\ell \), is lower. The second term in Equation (27) captures the expected gains from trade in the local market for an investors \( i \). The expected gains from trade have two components. The term \( \theta^i - \frac{\sum_{j \in N_1(\ell)} \theta^j}{n^\ell} \) captures the gains that the investor obtains from trading with other investors in her local market, while the term \( \theta^i - \frac{dV_2^\ell (q_1^\ell, m)}{dq_1^\ell} \) captures the gains that the investor obtains from trading with the dealer.

The gains from trading with other investors are increasing in the size of the local market. However, the gains from trading with the dealer may decrease with the size of the market. As we have explained in Section 3.2, a lower price impact in the local market tilts the dealer’s marginal valuation for the asset towards the average investor prior. Everything else equal, this effect decreases the investor’s gains from trading with the dealer. At the same time, in a larger market the average prior of the investors is closer to the common component of the priors which increases the gains from trading with the dealer. Hence, there may be a trade off between lower price impacts and higher gains from trade with investors, and lower gains from trade with the dealer that determines an investor’s incentives to deviate from a market structure \( m \). The following theorem states when symmetric market structures may arise in equilibrium.
Theorem 1. (Market fragmentation) There exists a threshold $n^*_D > 3$ such that for all $n_D \leq n^*_D$ there exists a threshold $\rho^*(n_D) \leq 1$ such that a symmetric fragmented structure with $n_I = n_D n_S$ investors and $n_D$ dealers can be supported in equilibrium if and only if $\rho \geq \rho^*(n_D)$.

Theorem 1 shows that when the interdealer market is sufficiently strategic and investor priors are sufficiently positively correlated, a fragmented market structure is an equilibrium and no individual investor has incentives to deviate to a larger local market. When choosing to trade in a larger market, the investor benefits from a lower price impact and higher gains from trade with the other investors at the cost of receiving a lower share of the gains from trade with the dealer.

The change in the gains from trading with the dealer in a larger market is easiest to understand in the limiting case in which investors have common priors and $\rho \to 1$. In this case, an additional investor in the local market will trade the exact same amount as the other investors. While this does not affect the average prior in the local market, it decreases the gains from trading with a dealer. This is because a dealer’s price impact will be lower in a larger local market which will shift the dealer’s marginal valuation closer to $\theta$. Put differently, the competition among investors increases, which allows the dealer to better exploit her position in the market. Hence, even though a dealer’s lower price impact increases the amount she trades, the increase is less than proportional to the size of the market.

As $\rho$ departs from 1 and investors disagree about the value of the asset, the loss in gains from trading with a dealer in a larger local market decreases. However, this loss in gains from trade still outweighs the benefit from having a smaller price impact and higher gains from trading with more investors, as long as the correlation in investors’ priors is high enough, i.e. $\rho > \rho^*$. In this case, deviating from a fragmented symmetric market structure is not profitable for any investor.

Remark. (Asymmetric market structures) Although the trading equilibrium in the interdealer and the local markets were derived for an arbitrary market structure, the main result in Theorem 1 characterizes the existence of symmetric market structures. However, there are also equilibria in the class of asymmetric market structures. That is, market structure in which at least one local market is larger than the other local markets. For example, a market structure in which there are $n_D = 3$ dealers, two local markets each with 6 investors and a third local market with 16 investors can be sustained in equilibrium for $\rho \in (0.895, 0.897)$, when $\gamma = 1$ and $\tau_\theta = 1$. This example suggests that while local markets with different number of participants can co-exist, these equilibria may not be as robust as symmetric markets structures absent of other forces. The heterogeneity in dealers’ customer base in various OTC markets could be explained by other factors, such as reputation, that are beyond the scope of our paper.

4 Interdealer trading and market fragmentation

The strategic behavior of dealers plays a crucial role in determining the equilibrium market structure. As we mentioned in the introduction, most dealer intermediated markets have a tiered structure. However, the number of participants in the interdealer markets varies, and so does their capacity to move prices. For instance, in the Treasury market there are only 23 dealers (see Afonso, Kovner
and Schoar (2013)), while in the muni bond market there are 10 to 30 core dealers and up to 2000 periphery dealers (see Li and Schurhoff (2018)). In this section we examine the role of the interdealer market for market fragmentation. We start by analyzing two polar cases: the case of a perfectly competitive interdealer market, and the case of no interdealer market. As we explain below, the first case is equivalent to taking the limit of dealer ℓ’s price impact in the interdealer market \( \lambda_2^\ell \to 0 \) in our main model, while the second case is equivalent to taking the limit of dealer ℓ’s price impact in the interdealer market \( \lambda_2^\ell \to \infty \). We end this section by extending the model to allow for dealer entry.

4.1 Perfectly competitive market

In our framework the interdealer market becomes perfectly competitive when the number of dealers grows large, i.e., when \( n_D \to \infty \). The following proposition shows the effect of interdealer trading on the equilibrium market structure in this limit.

**Proposition 3.** (Competitive interdealer market) No fragmented symmetric market structure can be supported in equilibrium as \( n_D \to \infty \).

Proposition 3 shows that dealers strategic trading behavior is a key determinant of market fragmentation. Indeed, as \( n_D \to \infty \) and the interdealer market becomes perfectly competitive, the price impact of each dealer in the interdealer market goes to 0. This implies that the marginal cost of unloading inventories in the interdealer market is independent of the size of the inventories. Therefore, it becomes cheaper for dealers to trade an additional unit and dealers are willing to trade more in larger local markets. Joining a larger local market becomes desirable for an investor, as she benefits from a lower price impact and higher gains from trade with other investors without facing lower gains from trade with the dealer. Formally, we have that \( \lim_{n_D \to \infty} \Delta^i (\rho; n_D) < 0 \) for all \( \rho \).

4.2 No interdealer market

The other limiting case is when there is no interdealer market. The set-up is identical to the one described in Section 2, except that dealers do not have any opportunity to trade at date \( t = 2 \). Thus, at \( t = 0 \) investors choose a dealer with whom to trade, and at \( t = 1 \) each dealer trades with the investors that chose her in a local market. Even though they do not value the asset intrinsically, dealers are willing to trade with investors provided the price is favorable to them. In particular, each dealer \( \ell \) chooses a demand function, \( Q_1^\ell (p_1^\ell; \theta) \), to maximize her objective function\(^8\)

\[
\max_{Q_1^\ell} -\frac{\gamma}{2} \left( Q_1^\ell (p_1^\ell; \theta) \right)^2 - p_1^\ell Q_1^\ell (p_1^\ell; \theta),
\]

taking into account the effect of her trade on the inverse residual demand function, \( p_{1,-\ell}^\ell \), in her local market which is implied by

\[
\sum_{j \in N_I(\ell)} X_1^j \left( p_{1,-\ell}; \theta, \eta \right) + q_1^\ell = 0.
\]

---

\(^8\)Since the case of no interdealer market is a special case of the general model, and to avoid burdening the reader, we keep the same notation as above.
The first-order condition for dealer $\ell$ implies that her optimal demand function is

$$Q_1^\ell \left( p_1^\ell; \theta \right) = -\frac{p_1^\ell}{\gamma + \lambda_1^\ell},$$

where $\lambda_1^\ell = \frac{\partial p_1^\ell}{\partial q_1^\ell}$ represents her price impact in local market $\ell$. The investors’ optimization problem is the same as described in Section 3.2. That is, the optimal demand of an investor $i$ in local market $\ell$ is given by

$$X_i^\ell \left( p_1^\ell; \theta_i \right) = \frac{\theta_i - p_1^\ell}{\gamma + \nu_i^\ell},$$

where $\nu_i^\ell = \frac{\partial p_1^\ell}{\partial x_i^\ell}$ is investor $i$’s price impact in the local market. As before, the price impact of the dealer and of the investors in the local market $\ell$ are equilibrium objects. In equilibrium, the price impacts are given by

$$\nu_i^\ell = \lambda_i^\ell = \frac{\gamma}{n^\ell - 1}.$$  

The model without an interdealer market is equivalent to taking the limit of the model presented in Section 2 when the price impact in the interdealer market goes to infinity, i.e., $\lambda_2^\ell \to \infty$ for all $\ell \in N_D$. In this case, since dealers no longer access an interdealer market, the marginal value of the asset for each dealer $\ell$ is simply the expected marginal benefit of increasing the quantity that the dealer acquires in the local market and is given by

$$\lim_{\lambda_2^\ell \to \infty} \frac{dV_2^\ell}{dq_1^\ell} = w^\ell \sum_{i \in N_I(\ell)} \theta_i \text{ and } \frac{dV_2^\ell}{dq_1^\ell} \text{ is given by Equation 22.}$$

The investor $i$’s value function given by Equation (27) becomes

$$V_i^1 (m) = \frac{\gamma}{2} + \nu_i^\ell \left( \theta_i - \frac{\sum_{j \in N_I(\ell)} \theta_j}{n^\ell} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( \theta_i - w^\ell \sum_{j \in N_I(\ell)} \theta_j \right)^2.$$

The market formation stage is just as in the setup with the interdealer market, described in Section 3.3. That is, an investor in a symmetric market structure, $m_{n_S}$, weighs the benefit of trading in a local market $\ell$ against one dealer and other $(n_S - 1)$ investors, against the benefit of trading in a local market $\ell'$ against one dealer and other $n_S$ investors. We obtain the following result.

**Proposition 4. (No interdealer market)** There exists a threshold $\hat{\rho}(n_S) \in [0,1)$ such that for all $\rho \geq \hat{\rho}(n_S)$ a fragmented symmetric market structure with $n_D$ dealers and $n_I = n_S n_D$ investors is an equilibrium.

Proposition 4 shows that fragmentation can be supported in equilibrium even in the absence of an interdealer market. When dealers do not have access to an interdealer market, the dealer’s willingness to intermediate in each local market is limited. Access to an interdealer market provides a dealer the opportunity to re-trade, which increases her willingness to intermediate. Thus, the presence of the interdealer market weakens the incentives of investors to trade in fragmented markets as it makes the
dealer’s demand more elastic to the size of their local market and decreases the competition among investors for the dealer’s liquidity.

While an interdealer market is not necessary to support market fragmentation in equilibrium, the role of dealers’ strategic trading behavior can only be examined if we allow dealers to intermediate through the interdealer market. The results above imply that allowing dealers to intermediate acts as a force against market fragmentation, while both dealers’ and investors’ market power represent a force that supports market fragmentation.

Remark. (Asymmetric market structures with no interdealer market) As in the model with an interdealer market, asymmetric market structures may arise in equilibrium. When there is no interdealer market, local markets of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. In this case, a market structure in which there are \( n_D = 3 \) dealers, two local markets each with 6 investors and a third local market with 16 investors can be sustained in equilibrium for \( \rho \in (0.881, 0.886) \), when \( \gamma = 1 \) and \( \tau_\theta = 1 \). Moreover, an asymmetric market structure with \( n_D \) dealers, \( n_D - 1 \) local markets with 6 investors and a very large perfectly competitive local market with \( n^\ell \to \infty \) can be sustained in equilibrium for \( \rho \in (0.903, 0.911) \). These asymmetric market structures are consistent with equity markets, in which alternative trading systems and exchanges with large players coexist (see Frazzini, Israel and Moskowitz (2018)).

4.3 Dealer entry and the degree of market fragmentation

A key determinant of market fragmentation is dealers’ strategic behavior. Outside of the two polar cases presented above (competitive interdealer market and no interdealer market) the degree of fragmentation depends on the number of dealers \( n_D \) that provide intermediation services. To provide insights about the degree of fragmentation that prevails, we extend our model to allow for dealer entry.

More specifically, we consider a large number of dealers \( \pi \) that can enter the market. Let \( e^\ell \in \{0, 1\} \) be an indicator function that takes the value 1 if dealer \( \ell \) enters the market. Denote by \( \mathbf{e} = (e^1, e^2, \ldots, e^n) \) the vector of ex-post entry decisions. For a given vector of entry decisions \( \mathbf{e} \), let \( N_D = \{ \ell | e^\ell = 1 \} \) be the set of dealers that decided to enter. After dealers make their entry decision, the game is identical to the one described in Section 2. At \( t = -1 \) dealers make their entry choice, at \( t = 0 \) investors choose a dealer with whom to trade, at \( t = 1 \) each dealer trades with the investors that chose her and at \( t = 2 \) all dealers that provided intermediation services at \( t = 1 \) trade in the inter-dealer market. The market structure is determined by the dealers’ decision at \( t = -1 \) and by the investors’ decisions at \( t = 0 \). While investors’ choices determine whether fragmentation is an equilibrium, as we discuss in Section 3.3, the dealers’ choices to enter the market determine the maximum degree of market fragmentation.

At date \( -1 \), a dealer \( \ell \) that enters expects to receive a payoff that depends on the market structure that is formed at date 0. We assume that dealers with no investors in their local market at date 1 are not allowed to participate in the interdealer market. This is in line with the main role of the interdealer market that stands to provides intermediation services between investors in local markets.

\footnote{We explicitly characterize these bounds in the Appendix.}
Thus the payoff of a dealer $\ell$ that enters and has $n_\ell$ investors in the market structure $m$ at date 0, is given by Eq. 6, while a payoff of a dealer that enters and has no investors obtains a payoff of 0.

Dealers have rational expectations and understand that investors make optimal choices at date 0. This implies that dealers understand that their payoff upon entry will depend on the market structure that arises in equilibrium at date 0. However, there are two challenges. First, when there are a finite number of investors and a finite number of dealers, a strictly symmetric market structure, one in which all dealers have the same number of investors, does not always exist. To address the non-divisibility of investors we will focus on market structures in which the dispersion in the distribution of investors across dealers is minimized. We refer to these market structures as generalized symmetric.

**Definition 2.** A generalized symmetric market structure, $m_G$, with $n_I$ investors and all $n_D$ active dealers in the set $N_D \subset \overline{N}_D$ is a market structure in which all $x$ dealers in the set $N_D^− \subset N_D$ have \( \left\lfloor \frac{n_I}{n_D} \right\rfloor \) investors and all $n_D - x$ dealers in the set $N_D \setminus N_D^−$ have $\left\lfloor \frac{n_I}{n_D} \right\rfloor + 1$, where

$$x = n_D \left( \left\lfloor \frac{n_I}{n_D} \right\rfloor + 1 \right) - n_I.$$ 

Under the generalized symmetric market structure $m_G$ the remaining $\overline{N}_D \setminus N_D$ dealers are not chosen by any investors and remain inactive.

Second, as Theorem 1 shows, there can be multiple symmetric market structures supported in equilibrium given a dispersion in investors beliefs $\rho$ (the number and identity of active dealers is not uniquely determined). The dealers’ payoffs from entering depend on the equilibrium that will be played in the market formation game at date 0. Therefore, the dealers’ decisions to enter depends on the likelihood of each equilibrium being played. To simplify the analysis, we will assume that there is a random variable $\mathcal{E} \left( \overline{N}_D \right)$, on which investors coordinate their beliefs about the other investors’ choices (sunspot), that determines the equilibrium generalized symmetric market structure that will be played at date 0 when the set of dealers $\overline{N}_D$ chooses to enter. To be more specific, each realization of $\mathcal{E} \left( \overline{N}_D \right)$ determines which dealers will be active and the size of their local markets in the market formation game.

Thus, at date $t = -1$, a dealer’s expected utility of entering the market is

$$V^{D,\ell} \left( \overline{N}_D \right) = \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{E} \left( N_D \right)} \left[ V^{\ell}_1 \left( m_G \right) \right],$$

(31)

where the expectation $\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{E} \left( N_D \right)}$ is taken over the realization of $\mathcal{E} \left( \overline{N}_D \right)$.

**Definition 3.** An equilibrium of the dealer entry game is a random variable $\mathcal{E} \left( \overline{N}_D \right)$ that determines the probability with which each equilibrium generalized symmetric market structure is played at date 0 and a vector of entry decisions for dealers, $e$, such that a dealer $\ell$ chooses to enter if $V^{D,\ell} \left( \overline{N}_D \right) \geq 0$.

If dealer entry is free, it is straightforward that all dealers decide to enter as their expected payoff in Equation (31) is (weakly) positive. Therefore, it follows that any (generalized) symmetric fragmented market structure that can be supported in equilibrium can also be sustained with free entry provided the number of dealers that can enter, $\overline{N}$, is sufficiently large relative to the number of investors. Figure
Note: Figure 3 shows the maximum number of active dealers in a generalized symmetric market structure as a function of the correlation in investor’s priors, $\rho$, for $n_I = 100$, $\gamma = 1$, and $\sigma^2_\theta = 1$.

Figure 3: Maximum degree of fragmentation

3 illustrates the maximum degree of fragmentation as a function of the correlation between investors’ valuations. As the figure shows, the maximum degree of fragmentation increases the more correlated investors’ valuations are. The higher the correlation between investors’ valuations, the more attractive it is for investors to trade in small local markets. Thus, a market structure with many small local markets can be supported in equilibrium if $\rho$ is high enough.

If dealers cost of entry is $r > 0$, a dealer will choose to enter if

$$V^{D,\ell}(\mathcal{N}_D) \geq r.$$ 

In this case, if the entry cost for dealers is high enough, the maximum degree of fragmentation in Figure 3 may not be sustained in equilibrium.

Even though our model focuses on the role of investors in determining the market structure in which an asset is traded, our analysis above shows that our results are robust to allowing for dealer entry. While the dealers’ behavior undoubtedly plays a role in the determining the degree of market fragmentation that can be attained, analyzing this channel is beyond the scope of this paper. Models like Cespa and Vives (forthcoming) that specifically address dealer entry are better suited to perform this task.
5 Liquidity and welfare in fragmented markets

In this section we analyze the welfare and liquidity properties of the equilibrium when markets are fragmented and contrast it with finding in the empirical literature. To provide a meaningful characterization, we start by studying the most natural benchmark of a centralized market before analyzing the liquidity and welfare in fragmented markets. For all the numerical illustrations in this section, we consider the case with $n_D = 7$, $n_S = 10$, $\gamma = 1$, and $\sigma_\theta^2 = 1$.

5.1 Centralized market

A useful benchmark to study the implications of market fragmentation is a centralized market. We consider that in a centralized market structure, $m_c$, trade takes place between all investors and dealers only at date 1. Just as in the case of fragmented markets, the agents’ trading strategies in a centralized market are represented by price-quantity schedules. The results in this section are standard and have been analyzed in the existing literature.\(^{10}\) We present them for completeness.

The strategy of an agent is a map from her information set to the space of demand functions, as follows. The demand function of an investor $i$ with prior $\theta_i$ is a continuous function $X^i_c : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, which maps the price $p^c$ that prevails in the centralized market into a quantity $x^i_c$ she wishes to trade. Similarly, the demand function of dealer $\ell$ who observes the common component $\theta$ is a continuous function $Q^\ell_c : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, which maps the price $p^c$, into a quantity $q^\ell_c$ she wishes to trade. The expected payoff for an investor $i$ at date 0, corresponding to the strategy profile $\{X^i_c, Q^\ell_c\}_{i \in N_I, \ell \in N_D}$ is

$$V^i_c(m_c) = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \theta^i X^i_c(p_c; \theta^i) - \frac{\gamma}{2} \left( X^i_c(p_c; \theta^i)^2 - p_c X^i_c(p_c; \theta^i) \right) \right]$$

while the expected payoff of a dealer $\ell$ at date 0 is

$$V^\ell_c(m_c) = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ -\frac{\gamma}{2} \left( Q^\ell_c(p_c; \theta) \right)^2 - p_c Q^\ell_c(p_c; \theta) \right],$$

where each $p_c$ is the price at which the market clears, and it is given by

$$\sum_{i \in N_I} X^i_c(p_c; \theta^i) + \sum_{\ell \in N_D} Q^\ell_c(p_c; \theta) = 0.$$

In a centralized market, all of the $n_I + n_D$ market participants solve the same problem as the one solved by an investor in a fragmented market structure. It is straightforward to show that there is a unique equilibrium at date 1 in a centralized market structure. In this equilibrium, the demand function for an investor $i$ is given by

$$X^i_c(p_c; \theta^i) = \frac{\theta^i - p_c}{\gamma + \lambda^i_c},$$

where $\lambda^i_c = \frac{\partial p_c}{\partial x^i_c}$ is the price impact of an investors in the centralized market. The demand function for a dealer $\ell$ is given by

$$Q^\ell_c(p_c; \theta) = -\frac{p_c}{\gamma + \lambda^\ell_c},$$

\(^{10}\)See for example Vives (2011), Malamud and Rostek (2017), and Manzano and Vives (forthcoming).
where $\lambda^c = \frac{\partial p_c}{\partial q^c}$ is the price impact of a dealer in the centralized market. In equilibrium, the price impacts are given by

$$\lambda^i = \lambda^c = \frac{\gamma}{n_I + n_D - 2},$$

and the price is

$$p_c = \frac{\sum_{j \in N_I} \theta^j}{n_I + n_D}. \tag{34}$$

As in the interdealer market, the equilibrium price in Equation (34) in the centralized market is equal to the average priors of the market’s participants. Putting together Equation (32) and Equation (34) we can see that a market participant $h$ will hold a larger position the larger the difference between her prior $\theta^h$ and the average prior in the market, where $\theta^h = 0$ for dealers. The detailed derivations are presented in the Appendix.

### 5.2 Liquidity

As we discussed in the sections above, disagreement among investors is a key determinant of market fragmentation in our model. Implicitly, disagreement also influences the liquidity in the local and interdealer markets. Empirically, disagreement and volume are tightly related. For example, it has been well established that trading volume and disagreement are correlated in equity markets (see Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) and Garfinkel (2009)). More recently, the relationship between volume and disagreement has also been documented in over-the-counter markets. For instance, Oehmke and Zawadowski (2017) find that disagreement is a strong determinant of trading volume in the CDS market. Similarly, Carlin, Longstaff and Matoba (2014) document that increased disagreement is associated with larger trading volume in the mortgage-backed security market.

In this section, we study the implications of our model for market liquidity. We start by looking at the liquidity of the interdealer market, which measures the amount of intermediation in the economy, and then focus on the liquidity of date 1 markets both in fragmented and centralized markets. Consistent with the empirical findings described above, in our model, volume in the interdealer and local markets are positively associated with disagreement among investors. Our model shows that there are two channels that gives rise to this relation. First, assets that are traded in fragmented markets have intrinsically low fundamental liquidity, proxied by low disagreement. Second, market fragmentation itself also contributes to low volumes associated with decentralized markets. Lastly, our model suggests that disagreement also affects the ratio between interdealer volume and the local market volume, which can be measured empirically by the volume in the interdealer market relative to the volume in the customer-dealer market.

**Intermediated volume**

Dealers act as intermediaries between investors in different local markets through the interdealer market. The amount traded in the interdealer market is the intermediated volume in a fragmented
market structure. The expected average trading volume in the interdealer market is

\[ V_D(m_{n_S}) = \frac{1}{2} E_0 \left[ \frac{\sum_{\ell \in N_D} |q_\ell|^2}{n_D} \right]. \]

As argued above, the dealers’ willingness to intermediate decreases as the correlation in investors’ priors approaches 1. Lemma 2 formalizes this intuition and shows that intermediated volume decreases with the correlation in investor priors and goes to zero as this correlation goes to 1.

Note: Figure 4 shows traded volume in the interdealer market in a symmetric market structure as a function of the correlation in investor valuation, \( \rho \). The dashed vertical line represents the threshold \( \rho^* \) above which a symmetric market structure is an equilibrium. The parameters for the figure are \( n_D = 7 \), \( n_S = 10 \), \( \gamma = 1 \), and \( \sigma^2 = 1 \).

Figure 4: Intermediated volume

**Lemma 2. (Intermediated Volume)** In a symmetric fragmented market structure, the volume intermediated by dealers in the interdealer market increases with the level of disagreement \( (1 - \rho) \), \( \frac{\partial V_D}{\partial \rho} < 0 \) with \( \lim_{\rho \to 1} V_D = 0 \).

When markets are fragmented, a higher correlation in investor priors leads to a smaller price dispersion in local markets. This smaller dispersion implies a smaller dispersion in dealer inventories and, thus, decreases the gains from trade in the interdealer market, which leads to a lower interdealer volume, as shown by Lemma 2. As the correlation in investor priors approaches 1, price dispersion among local markets is 0 and intermediated volume goes to 0.\(^{11}\) As we discuss in Section 5.3, when \( \rho = 1 \) and intermediated volume is zero, dealers do not profit from intermediation and they are better off in a centralized market than in a fragmented one. Figure 4 shows intermediated volume as a function of the correlation in investor priors \( \rho \).

\(^{11}\)Note that the observation that intermediated volume goes to 0 as \( \rho \) goes to 1 holds only in a symmetric fragmented market. Typically, trade in the interdealer market is positive if there is a different number of investors in each local market, even when \( \rho = 1 \).
Note: Figure 5 shows the traded volume at date 1 in fragmented and centralized market structures as a function of the correlation in investor priors, $\rho$. The solid line represents aggregate volume in local markets in a symmetric fragmented market structure and the dashed line represents volume in a centralized market structure. The dashed vertical line represents the threshold $\rho^*$ above which a symmetric market structure is an equilibrium. The parameters for the figure are $n_D = 7$, $n_S = 10$, $\gamma = 1$, and $\sigma^2 = 1$.

Figure 5: Volume

**Volume**

The liquidity of the markets at date 1 depends on the market structure. In a fragmented market structure, expected average trading volume in local market $\ell$ is given by

$$V^{\ell}(m_{ns}) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{n^{\ell} + 1} \right) |x^{\ell}_1| + \sum_{i \in N_I(\ell)} |q^i_1|.$$  

Analogously, in a centralized market structure, expected average trading volume is given by

$$V_c = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\ell \in N_D} \frac{|x^{\ell}_c| + \sum_{i \in N_I} |q^i_c|}{n_f + n_D}.$$  

The amount of trade in local markets also depends on the level of disagreement between investors. Lemma 3 shows that volume decreases with the correlation in investor priors in symmetric market structures, regardless of whether the market is fragmented.

**Lemma 3.** (Volume) Expected trading volume in local markets increases with the level of disagreement in the market $(1 - \rho)$ a) in the local markets in a fragmented symmetric market structure, $\frac{\partial V^{\ell}}{\partial \rho} < 0$, and b) in a centralized market structure, $\frac{\partial V_c}{\partial \rho} < 0$.

As can be seen from Lemma 3, the less disagreement among investors, the lower the gains from trade and, thus, the lower the incentives to trade in the market at date 1. Figure 5 depicts date 1
trading volume in centralized and fragmented symmetric market structures. The solid line represents
the expected average volume in a fragmented market at date 1 measured as the average of the expected
volume in all local markets, \( \sum_{\ell \in ND} \frac{v^{\ell}}{n^{D}} \). The dashed line is the expected average volume in a centralized
market and the dotted black line is the threshold \( \rho^* \) above which a symmetric fragmented market is an
equilibrium. Lemma 3, together with Theorem 1, confirms the intuition that assets that are traded in
fragmented markets have intrinsically low fundamental liquidity, proxied by high \( \rho \). However, Figure
5 shows that the market structure itself also contributes to low volumes associated with decentralized
markets. For a given level of disagreement \( (1 - \rho) \), the volume traded is lower in fragmented markets
than in centralized ones.

5.3 Welfare

Over the past decade, there have been proposals for a substantial regulatory overhaul of fragmented
markets, with many calling for centralizing trade. While price transparency and counterparty risk
have been the main targets of these reforms, their effect on dealer and investor welfare has been an
important consideration. In this section, we compare the investor and dealer welfare in fragmented
and centralized market structures. We find that while dealers may prefer to trade in a fragmented
market, investors always benefit from trading in a centralized market structure. However, without
the ability to coordinate, investors may not be able to trade in the centralized market. This lack of
coordination is reminiscent of the problem faced by customers for many OTC derivatives who choose
to trade in the venue currently providing the greatest level of liquidity, but cannot move to a welfare
improving market structure without the intervention of a higher level authority (see Spatt, Duffie and
Kyle (2010)).

Investor welfare

The expected welfare of an investor \( i \) who chooses a dealer \( \ell \) in a symmetric market structure \( m_{ns} \)
when the level of disagreement is \( 1 - \rho \) is given by

\[
V^i_1(m_{ns}) = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \theta^i x^i_1 - \frac{\gamma}{2} (x^i_1)^2 - p^i_1 x^i_1 \right],
\]

where \( x^i_1 \) and \( p^i_1 \) are, respectively, the quantity of the asset the investor purchases and the price she
pays for this quantity in equilibrium. The investor’s expected welfare in a centralized market is

\[
V^i_c(m_c) = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \theta^i x^i_c - \frac{\gamma}{2} (x^i_c)^2 - p_c x^i_c \right],
\]

where \( x^i_c \) and \( p_c \) are, respectively, the quantity of the asset the investor purchases and the price she
pays for this quantity in equilibrium.

Lemma 4. (Gains from trade) For a given symmetric fragmented market structure \( m_{ns} \), an
investor’s welfare is continuous and monotonically increasing in the level of disagreement \( (1 - \rho) \),
i.e., \( \frac{\partial V^i_1(m_{ns})}{\partial \rho} < 0 \).
Lemma 4 shows that the lower the disagreement in the market, the lower the investors’ expected welfare in a symmetric fragmented market. A higher correlation in investor priors implies lower gains from trade between investors in the local markets and between dealers in the interdealer market. The lower these gains from trade, the lower the investors’ expected welfare.

Let $\Delta V^i \equiv V^i_c (m_c) - V^i_1 (m_{nS})$ be the difference between investors’ expected utility in centralized and fragmented numbers with the same number of dealers. The following proposition compares investor welfare in centralized and fragmented markets.

**Proposition 5. (Investor welfare)** Investors are always better off in a centralized market structure, i.e., $\Delta V^i > 0 \ \forall \rho$.

As Proposition 5 shows, investors are always better off in a centralized market structure than in a fragmented one. Figure 6 illustrates this result. The solid line represents investor welfare in fragmented markets, the dashed line represents investor welfare in centralized markets, and the vertical dotted line is the threshold $\rho^*$ above which the symmetric fragmented market structure is an equilibrium. A centralized market structure reduces the investors’ price impact and it increases the expected gains from trade. When all investors trade in the same market, the expected gains from trade for an investor are larger than when her trade with investors in other local markets is intermediated by dealers. Though the effect on the expected gains from trade disappears when $\rho = 1$, the lower price impact associated with trading in a bigger market is always present and investors are always strictly better off in a centralized market structure.

**Dealer welfare**

A dealer’s expected welfare in a symmetric fragmented market structure is

$$V^\ell_1 (m_{nS}) = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ -\frac{\gamma}{2} (q^\ell_1 + q^\ell_2)^2 - p^\ell_1 q^\ell_1 - p^\ell_2 q^\ell_2 \right],$$

where $q^\ell_1$ and $q^\ell_2$ are, respectively, the quantities the dealer buys in the local market at price $p^\ell_1$ and in the interdealer market at price $p^\ell_2$, in equilibrium. In a centralized market structure, a dealer’s expected welfare is

$$V^\ell_c (m_c) = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ -\frac{\gamma}{2} (q^\ell_c)^2 - p_c q^\ell_c \right],$$

where $q^\ell_c$ is the quantity the dealer purchases at price $p_c$ in the market, in equilibrium.

**Lemma 5. (Gains from intermediation)** For a given symmetric fragmented market structure $m_{nS}$, a dealer’s welfare is continuous and monotonically decreasing in $\rho$, i.e., $\frac{\partial V_1^\ell (m_{nS})}{\partial \rho} < 0$.

Lemma 5 states that dealer welfare is increasing in the level of disagreement in the market, $(1 - \rho)$. A higher correlation in investors’ priors leads to a smaller price dispersion among the local markets. The only difference among dealers in their local markets in a symmetric market structure is the local price they face. Therefore, the more similar the prices in the local markets, the more similar the inventories dealers carry to the interdealer market and the smaller the gains for dealers from intermediating trade between the local markets through the interdealer market.
Investor welfare

Fragmented market
Centralized market

Note: Figure 6 shows investor welfare in centralized and fragmented markets as a function of the correlation in investor priors, $\rho$. The solid line represents dealer welfare in a symmetric fragmented market structure and the dashed line represents dealer welfare in a centralized market structure. The dashed vertical line represents the threshold $\rho^*$ above which a symmetric market structure is an equilibrium. The parameters for the figure are $n_D = 7$, $n_S = 10$, $\gamma = 1$, and $\sigma_\theta^2 = 1$.

Figure 6: Investor welfare

Let $\Delta V^D \equiv V^\ell_c(m_c) - V^\ell_1(m_{nS})$ be the welfare gain for dealers from trading in a centralized market. The following proposition compares dealer welfare in centralized and fragmented markets.

**Proposition 6.** *(Dealer welfare)* There exists a $\rho_W \in (0,1)$ such that for $\rho < \rho_W$ dealers are better off in symmetric fragmented markets and for $\rho > \rho_W$ dealers are better off in centralized markets, i.e.,

$$
\Delta V^D = \begin{cases} 
> 0 & \text{if } \rho > \rho_W \\
= 0 & \text{if } \rho = \rho_W \\
< 0 & \text{if } \rho < \rho_W 
\end{cases}
$$

Proposition 6 shows that dealers benefit from trading in a fragmented market structure when disagreement among investors is high and in a centralized market when disagreement is low. Trading in a fragmented market structure allows dealers to profit from intermediating trades between investors in different local markets through the interdealer market. The profits from intermediation disappear when the market structure is centralized. However, a centralized market offers a lower price impact than a fragmented one, making it cheaper for dealers to achieve their desired positions. When investor priors are very dispersed, $\rho < \rho_W$, the dealers’ profits from intermediation are high and overcome the higher price impact associated with trading in fragmented market structures. In this case, dealers are better off in fragmented markets. When investor priors are very correlated and $\rho > \rho_W$, the dealers’
Note: Figure 7 shows dealer welfare in centralized and fragmented markets as a function of the correlation in investor priors, $\rho$. The solid line represents dealer welfare in a symmetric fragmented market structure and the dashed line represents dealer welfare in a centralized market structure. The dashed vertical line represents the threshold $\rho^\star$ above which a symmetric market structure is an equilibrium. The parameters for the figure are $n_D = 7$, $n_S = 10$, $\gamma = 1$, and $\sigma^2_\theta = 1$.

Figure 7: Dealer welfare

profits from intermediating are small and the effect on price impact dominates. In this case, dealers are strictly better off trading in a centralized market.

Figure 7 illustrates a dealer’s expected welfare in a fragmented market structure and in a centralized market structure. The solid line represents dealer welfare in fragmented markets which, consistent with Lemma 5, is decreasing in $\rho$. The dashed line represents dealer welfare in centralized markets and the vertical dotted line is the threshold $\rho^\star$ above which the symmetric fragmented market structure is an equilibrium. The threshold $\rho_W$ above which dealers are better in a centralized market is given by the intersection of the dotted and solid lines.

Efficiency

From Propositions 5 and 6 it follows that investors and dealers benefit differently from different market structures. When there is enough disagreement in the market, so that $\rho < \rho_W$, dealers are better off in fragmented markets, while investors are better off in centralized ones. If there is little disagreement, so that $\rho > \rho_W$, both investors and dealers are better off trading in a centralized market than trading in a fragmented one, and a fragmented symmetric market structure is inefficient. If $\rho^\star > \rho_W$, a fragmented market is inefficient even if it is supported in equilibrium. The inefficiency is due to a coordination failure which prevents investors from choosing to trade in a centralized market structure.
Indeed, when $\rho > \rho^*$, there is no benefit for an individual investor from deviating from a fragmented market structure $m_{n_S}$ given that all other investors trade in the structure $m_{n_S}$. Naturally, our model abstracts from regulatory changes, that could have a major impact on how various assets are traded. However, if one thinks of regulatory reforms as a coordination device between market participants, centralization can arise when market fragmentation is inefficient. If this is the case, assets for which investors have very highly correlated priors could be traded in centralized markets.

6 Learning from prices

So far, we have assumed that there is perfect information about the aggregate state of the economy. In this section, we modify the information structure in our baseline model to consider the case in which there is learning from prices.

The model is the same as the baseline with the difference that neither investors nor dealers observe the aggregate sentiment in the market, $\theta$. After choosing a dealer, each investor $i$ observes her prior about the value of the asset, $\theta^i$, but cannot distinguish the idiosyncratic component in her beliefs $\eta^i$ from the aggregate sentiment $\theta$. We assume that each investor’s prior is private information of the investor. Before trading in her local market, each dealer $\ell$ observes a private signal of the aggregate sentiment in the economy given by $s^\ell = \theta + \varepsilon^\ell$ where $\varepsilon^\ell \overset{i.i.d.}{\sim} N(0, \sigma^2_{\varepsilon})$. Note that the model with $\sigma^2_{\varepsilon} = 0$ is exactly the model with full information presented in Section 2.

As in the model with perfect information, the price in the interdealer market and, hence, the dealers’ valuation for the asset in their local markets depend on $\theta$. While dealers do not observe $\theta$ directly, they learn about it from their private signal and from the price in their local market. Since each investor trades based on her prior, $\theta^i$, the price in the local market reflects the priors of the investors in that market and contains information about $\theta$. Therefore, dealers learn from the price in their local market to predict the price in the interdealer market. The informativeness of the local price $p^\ell_1$ about $\theta$ depends on the number of investors in that local market and on the dispersion of their priors. In particular, the larger the number of investors in the local market, the more precise the signal contained in the price. Moreover, if all investors share the same prior, the price in the local market is fully revealing and the dealer infers $\theta$ perfectly from the price. However, the equilibrium in this case is not the same as in the case with full information since dealers learn from prices, and therefore, react less to prices than they would if they observed $\theta$ directly. On the other extreme, if the investors’ priors are uncorrelated, the local price is not helpful in predicting the price in the interdealer market and there is no learning from prices.

An investor’s problem in the local market and a dealer’s problem in the interdealer market are analogous to the ones in the baseline model. The definition of equilibrium is analogous to the one in the baseline model. The equilibrium in the interdealer market is exactly the same as in the model without learning, characterized in Proposition 1. There is no learning in the interdealer market. Since

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12 Whether investors observe $\theta$ is irrelevant since their utility, and therefore their demand, depends only on $\theta^i$.

13 Alternatively, dealers could observe a public signal. The analysis below does not depend on the dealers’ information being private.
Note: Figure 8 shows price impacts in the local markets in a symmetric equilibrium in the local market for a symmetric fragmented market structure for the baseline model and the model with imperfect information as a function of the variance of the dealers’ signals, $\sigma^2$. Panel a shows the price impact of a dealer and Panel b shows the price impact of an investor. The dotted lines represent the price impacts in the baseline model and the solid lines represent the price impacts in the model imperfect information. The parameters for the figure are $n_D = 7$, $n_S = 10$, $\gamma = 1$, $\rho = 0.9$, and $\sigma^2 = 1$.

Figure 8: Price Impacts

dealers do not value the asset intrinsically, they only care about the value of $\theta$ to predict $p_2$. Then, the dealer’s problem in her local market $\ell$ when she observes a signal $s^\ell$ is

$$\max_{q_1^\ell} V_2^\ell \left( q_1^\ell, p_1^\ell, s_1^\ell, m \right) = -\frac{\gamma}{2} Q_2^\ell \left( p_2^\ell; q_1^\ell \right) - p_1^\ell q_1^\ell,$$

where now $V_2^\ell \left( q_1^\ell, p_1^\ell, s_1^\ell, m \right)$ is the expected payoff of participating in the inter-dealer market for dealer $\ell$ and it is given by

$$V_2^\ell \left( q_1^\ell, p_1^\ell, s_1^\ell, m \right) = \mathbb{E} \left[ Q_2^\ell \left( p_2^\ell; q_1^\ell \right) \right],$$

with $Q_2^\ell \left( p_2^\ell; q_1^\ell \right)$ given by Equation (13). The main difference between a dealer’s problem in this section and the one with full information is the information set over which the dealers condition their expected utility. When dealers do not observe $\theta$, they learn about it from their signals $s^\ell$ and from the price in the local market $p_1^\ell$.

The demand functions of investor $i$ and dealer $\ell$ in local market $\ell$ are

$$X_i^\ell = \theta_i - p_1^\ell \gamma + \nu_1^\ell$$

and

$$Q_1^\ell = \frac{1}{\lambda_1^\ell} \left( \frac{dV_2^\ell \left( q_1^\ell, p_1^\ell, s_1^\ell, m \right)}{dq_1^\ell} - p_1^\ell \right),$$

respectively, where $\nu_1^\ell = \frac{\partial p_1^\ell}{\partial x_1^i}$ and $\lambda_1^\ell = \frac{\partial p_1^\ell}{\partial q_1^\ell}$ are the dealer’s and investors’ price impacts in the local market, and $p_2$ is the equilibrium price in the interdealer market in Equation (14). Market clearing in
the local market implies that the equilibrium price in the local market solves

$$p^\ell_1 = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\sum_{j \in N_I(\ell)} \theta^j}{n^\ell} + \frac{dV_2^\ell \left(q^\ell_1, p^\ell_1, s^\ell, m\right)}{dq^\ell_1} \right).$$

(36)

Differentiating Equation (35) and using the expression for $q^\ell_2$ in Equation (15) we have that

$$\frac{dV_2^\ell}{dq^\ell_1} = -\gamma \left( \frac{\lambda_2^\ell}{\gamma + \lambda_2^\ell} q^\ell_1 + \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + \lambda_2^\ell} \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{l \in N_D} q^l_1 \mid s^\ell, p^\ell_1 \right] \right),$$

where $\lambda_2^\ell \equiv \frac{\partial p_2, -\ell}{\partial q^\ell_2}$ is the price impact of dealer $\ell$ in the interdealer market. The expected marginal benefit of trading in the interdealer market for dealer $\ell$ depends on the dealer’s trades in her local market and on her forecast of the other dealers’ trades in their local markets, which are a function of $\theta$. When dealers observe imperfect signals of $\theta$, these forecasts also depend on the whole market structure. To see this, note that $p^\ell_1$ contains additional information about $\theta$ over the dealer’s private signal $s^\ell$. Moreover, the precision of the information contained in the price $p^\ell_1$ depends on the number of investors in local market $\ell$, as it can be seen from Equation (36). Therefore, a dealer’s forecast of the quantities traded by the other investors, and thus, her demand in the local market, depend on the number of investors in her local market. Since this is true for all dealers, a dealer’s valuation of the asset in the local market depends on the whole market structure and the price impacts are no longer independent of the price impacts in other local markets as in Lemma 1.

Figure 8 shows the price impacts in a symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies for a symmetric market structure as a function of $\sigma_2^2$. As it can be seen in the figure, when the signal is perfectly informative, i.e., $\sigma_2^2 = 0$, we are back in the full information case. As $\sigma_2^2$ increases the signal received by the dealers becomes noisier and dealers face higher uncertainty about the price in the interdealer market, which leads to higher price impacts in the local markets. The added uncertainty about $\theta$ decreases a dealer’s incentives to provide liquidity in her local market and increases the cost of trading in the strategic local markets for investors and dealers alike. A full characterization of the equilibrium, including the price impacts, can be found in the Appendix.

As in the baseline model, at date 0, before any uncertainty is realized, each investor $i$ chooses a dealer with whom to trade. Each investor $i$ takes the other investors’ choices as given so, from investor $i$’s perspective, choosing a dealer with whom to trade is the same as choosing between two market structures. An investor $i$ will choose not to deviate from a symmetric fragmented market structure if

$$\tilde{\Delta}^i \left( \rho; n_D, \sigma_2^2 \right) > 0, \quad \forall i \in N_I, \forall \ell' \neq \ell, \forall \ell, \ell' \in N_D,$$

(37)

where, analogously to the baseline model, $\tilde{\Delta}^i \left( \rho; n_D, \sigma_2^2 \right)$ is the marginal benefit for investor $i$ of participating in symmetric market structure, $m_{n_S}$, relative to participating in market structure $(m_{n_S} - i\ell + i\ell')$, when the correlation across investor priors is $\rho$, when there are $n_D$ dealers, and the variance of the noise in the dealers’ signals is $\sigma_2^2$. When comparing the benefits of trading in a market with $n_S$ or $n_S + 1$ investors, an investor anticipates how the change in the market structure affects the dealer trades in the interdealer market.
Note: Figure 9 shows the combinations of \( n_D \) and \( \rho \) such that a fragmented market with \( n_D \) dealers and \( n_I = n_S n_D \) investors can be supported in equilibrium for the baseline case with full information and for the case in which investors’ signals are not informative, i.e., \( \sigma^2 \epsilon \to \infty \). The parameters for the figure are \( n_S = 4 \), \( \gamma = 1 \), and \( \sigma^2 \theta = 1 \).

Figure 9: Market fragmentation and learning from prices

**Proposition 7. (Market fragmentation learning from prices)** There exists a threshold \( \tilde{n}_D^* > 3 \) such that for any \( n_D \leq \tilde{n}_D^* \) there exists a threshold \( \tilde{\rho}^* (n_D) \leq 1 \) such that a symmetric fragmented structure with \( n_I = n_D n_S \) investors and \( n_D \) dealers can be supported in equilibrium if \( \rho \geq \tilde{\rho}^* (n_D) \).

The proposition above shows that when investor priors are sufficiently positively correlated a symmetric fragmented market structure is an equilibrium. The proof of Proposition 7 relies on the continuity of the equilibrium on \( \sigma^2 \epsilon \) and using that setting \( \sigma^2 \epsilon = 0 \) gives us the baseline model with full information. Note that when investors’ valuations are perfectly correlated, the price in the local market is perfectly revealing. However, since dealers do not value the asset intrinsically, there are always gains from trade between an investors and the dealer in the local market. Therefore, the Grossman paradox associated with no trade in fully revealing equilibria does not apply to our model.

In what follows we resort to numerical examples to further explore how learning from prices affects market fragmentation.

As in the baseline model, when considering whether to deviate investors trade-off a lower price impact in a larger local market versus lower expected gains of trading with the dealer. Relative to the case with full information, the decrease in gains from trading with the dealer is lower when dealers learn from prices. As we explained in our discussion of Theorem 1, the lower price impact in a a larger local market induces the dealer increase her trades but less than proportionally to the size of the market. When there is imperfect information, there is an additional effect on the dealers trade coming from learning from prices. The price in a larger local market has more precise information about the aggregate sentiment \( \theta \) (it aggregates one additional signal) and leads to the dealer increasing her position beyond the increase due to the lower price impact. Therefore, the change in the dealer’s position in a larger local market is increasing in how much the dealer learns from the price. This implies that the increase in competition among investors is lower when dealers learn from prices and either
a higher correlation in investor valuations or fewer active dealers are needed to support a symmetric fragmented market structure.

Figure 9 shows the combinations of $\rho$ and $n_D$ for which market fragmentation can be supported in equilibrium for the cases with full information and without signals for dealers. This figure shows that when dealers learn from the price, it is harder to support fragmentation in equilibrium. However, even when learning from the price is strongest, i.e., when $\rho = 1$ and the price is fully revealing, a fragmented market structure can still be supported in equilibrium as long as the inter-dealer market is strategic enough. This shows that the effects highlighted in the baseline model with full information are of first-order importance even when there is learning from prices. Figure 10 show the threshold $\tilde{\rho}^*$ in Proposition 7 as a function of the variance of the noise in the signals received by the dealers. Consistent with our intuition above, $\tilde{\rho}^*$ is increasing in $\sigma^2_\varepsilon$.

7 Conclusion

We develop a model of market formation in which investors have heterogeneous priors about the value of an asset to study the determinants of asset market fragmentation. When choosing a dealer, investors trade off the lower price impact that a larger market offers and a larger share of gains from trade with a dealer attained in a smaller market. When disagreement between investors is low, the decrease in gains from trade with the dealer dominates the decrease in price impact, and investors have no incentives to deviate from a fragmented market structure. We find that dealers can benefit from trading in fragmented asset markets, while investors are always better off in centralized ones. When the correlation in investor priors is high enough, equilibrium fragmented markets are inefficient. Fragmented markets contribute to lower trading volume relative to a centralized markets. Our model emphasizes the role of investors’ strategic behavior in determining the market structure in which an
asset is traded. By focusing on the investors’ choices, we add to the current view on the optimal market structure, which often considers that investors are passive player in the emergence of the market structure.

There are several important mechanisms that can contribute to markets having different degrees of fragmentation. Some of the mechanisms that have been proposed focus on information considerations through order flows, regulation (e.g., Reg ATS), technological advancements (e.g., automation, electronic LOBs), and minimum tick size (e.g., fees make effective prices almost continuous). In this paper, we focus on disagreement as the driving force for market fragmentation through the lens of a model that explores the interaction between two liquidity proxies: the price impact of the market participants and the amount of intermediation that dealers are willing to offer. Looking at these features allows us to identify a novel mechanism that contributes to the determination of the market structure. This mechanism is present even in the absence of differences in fee schedules, informational asymmetries or regulatory constraints. Though we find suggestive evidence consistent with our model’s results, it remains an open empirical question to quantify the magnitudes of these competing forces.
References


Hugonnier, Julien, Benjamin Lester, and Pierre-Olivier Weill. 2015. “Heterogeneity in Decentralized Asset Markets.” working paper UCLA.


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APPENDIX

A Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1

The first order condition in Equation (12) for the dealer’s optimization problem yields

\[ Q_{2}^\ell (p_2; \theta, q_1^\ell) = \frac{-\gamma q_1^\ell - p_2}{\gamma + \lambda_2^\ell} \]

where \( \lambda_2^\ell = \frac{\partial p_2}{\partial q_2^\ell} \). We conjecture and subsequently verify that each dealer’s equilibrium strategy is a linear demand function as follows

\[ Q_{2}^\ell (p_2; \theta, q_1^\ell) = a_D q_1^\ell + b_D p_2. \]

Market clearing implies

\[ p_2 = \frac{a_D \sum_{l=1}^{n_D} q_1^l}{n_D b_D}, \text{ and } \lambda_2^\ell = -\frac{1}{(n_D - 1) b_D}. \]

(A.1)

Then, matching coefficients

\[ a_D = -\frac{n_D - 2}{n_D - 1}, \text{ and } b_D = -\frac{1}{\gamma n_D - 1}. \]

(A.2)

The unique solution for the system in Equation (A.2) is given by

\[ a_D = -\frac{n_D - 2}{n_D - 1}, \text{ and } b_D = -\frac{1}{\gamma n_D - 1}. \]

Therefore, the equilibrium strategy of a dealer in the interdealer market is

\[ Q_{2}^\ell (p_2; \theta, q_1^\ell) = -\frac{n_D - 2}{n_D - 1} \left( q_1^\ell + \frac{1}{\gamma} p_2 \right) \]

and, using the market clearing condition, the equilibrium price is

\[ p_2 \left( \{ q_1^l \}_{l \in n_D} \right) = -\frac{\sum_{l \in n_D} q_1^l}{n_D}. \]

Proof of Proposition 2

We conjecture and subsequently verify that in each local market \( \ell \) the dealer’s equilibrium strategy is a linear demand function given by

\[ Q_{1}^\ell (p_1^\ell; \theta) = \alpha^\ell \theta + b^\ell p_1^\ell, \]

and each investor’s equilibrium strategy is a linear demand function given by

\[ X_{i}^1 (p_1^\ell; \theta^i) = \alpha^\ell \theta^i + \beta^\ell p_1^\ell. \]

Market clearing implies

\[ p_1^\ell = -\frac{(n^\ell \alpha^\ell + \alpha^\ell) \theta + n^\ell \beta^\ell + \sum_{i \in n_I(\ell)} \eta^i}{n^\ell \beta^\ell + b^\ell}, \]

and

\[ \lambda_1^\ell = -\frac{1}{n^\ell \beta^\ell}, \text{ and } \nu_1^\ell = -\frac{1}{(n^\ell - 1) \beta^\ell + b^\ell}. \]

(A.3)
The first order condition in Equation (16) for the investor’s optimization problem yields

\[ x_1^i = \frac{\theta^i - p_1^i}{\gamma + v_1^i}, \]  
(A.4)

where \( v_1^i = \frac{\partial \eta_1^i}{\partial x_1^i} \). The first order condition for the dealer’s optimization problem is

\[ \frac{dV_2^\ell}{dq_1^\ell} - p_1^\ell - \frac{\partial p_1^\ell - \ell}{\partial q_1^\ell} q_1^\ell = 0, \]

where \( V_2^\ell (m) \) represents the payoff that dealer \( \ell \) expects to receive after participating in the interdealer market and it is given by

\[ V_2^\ell (m) = \mathbb{E} \left[ -\frac{\gamma}{2} (q_2^\ell \ast + q_1^\ell) - p_2 q_2^\ell \mid \theta, p_1^\ell \right]. \]

Differentiating the profits of the dealer from participating in the interdealer market, we obtain

\[ \frac{dV_2^\ell (m)}{dq_1^\ell} = \frac{\partial V_2^\ell (m)}{\partial q_1^\ell} + \frac{\partial V_2^\ell (m)}{\partial q_2^\ell} \frac{dq_2^\ell}{dq_1^\ell}. \]

Using the first order condition for the dealer in the interdealer market we have that

\[ \frac{\partial V_2^\ell (m)}{\partial q_1^\ell} = 0, \]

which immediately implies that

\[ \frac{dV_2^\ell (m)}{dq_1^\ell} = -\gamma (q_1^\ell + \mathbb{E} [Q_2^\ell (p_2; \theta, q_1^\ell) \mid \theta, q_1^\ell]). \]

Thus we can rewrite the first order condition for the dealer as

\[ -\gamma (q_1^\ell + \mathbb{E} [Q_2^\ell (p_2; \theta, q_1^\ell) \mid \theta, q_1^\ell]) - p_1^\ell - \frac{\partial p_1^\ell - \ell}{\partial q_1^\ell} q_1^\ell = 0. \]

Substituting the equilibrium demand function of the dealer in the interdealer market, \( Q_2^\ell (p_2; \theta, q_1^\ell) \), we obtain that

\[ q_1^\ell = \frac{(\gamma + \lambda_2^\ell)}{\gamma \lambda_2^\ell + \lambda_1^\ell (\gamma + \lambda_2^\ell)} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + \lambda_2^\ell} \mathbb{E} [p_2 \mid \theta, p_1^\ell] - p_1^\ell \right). \]

It follows that

\[ q_1^\ell = -\gamma \frac{(n_{D-1})}{n_{D}} \sum_{l \in N_D, l \neq \ell} \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\partial \eta_1^l | \theta, p_1^\ell}{\partial \eta_1^l} \right] - p_1^\ell, \]  
(A.5)

where

\[ \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{l \in N_D, l \neq \ell} q_1^l | \theta, q_1^\ell \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{l \in N_D, l \neq \ell} \left( a^h \theta - b^h \left( \frac{(n_{h, \alpha}^h + a^h)}{n_{h, \beta}^h + b^h} \right) \right) \right] \]

\[ = \sum_{l \in N_D, l \neq \ell} \left( a^h - b^h \left( \frac{(n_{h, \alpha}^h + a^h)}{n_{h, \beta}^h + b^h} \right) \right) \theta = \sum_{l \in N_D, l \neq \ell} n_{h, \alpha}^h a^h - \frac{n_{h, \alpha}^h + a^h}{n_{h, \beta}^h + b^h} \theta. \]

Using the demand functions in equations (A.4) and (A.5), and matching the coefficients with our guess for an equilibrium in linear strategies we get the following system.
Recall that

\[ a^\ell = b^\ell \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D - 1} \sum_{i \in N_D, i \neq \ell} n_i \frac{a_i^\ell \beta^\ell - a^\ell b_i^\ell}{n_i \beta_i^\ell + b_i^\ell} \quad \text{(A.6)} \]

\[ b^\ell = -\frac{n^\ell \beta^\ell n_D}{2\gamma n^\ell \beta^\ell - n_D} \]

\[ \alpha^\ell = \frac{(n^\ell - 1) \beta^\ell + b^\ell}{\gamma ((n^\ell - 1) \beta^\ell + b^\ell) - 1} \]

\[ \beta^\ell = -\frac{(n^\ell - 1) \beta^\ell + b^\ell}{\gamma ((n^\ell - 1) \beta^\ell + b^\ell) - 1} \]

We solve for \( \beta^\ell \) in the system of equations (A.6). It follows that \( \beta^\ell \) is given by the negative solution to

\[ H(\beta) = 0, \]

where

\[ H(\beta) = -2n^\ell (n^\ell - 1) (\gamma \beta)^2 + ((2n^\ell - 1) n_D + 2n^\ell - 2n^\ell (n^\ell - 1)) \gamma \beta + 2(n^\ell - 1) n_D. \]

Since \( H(0) > 0 \) and \( H''(\cdot) < 0 \), a solution to \( H(\beta) = 0 \) always exists and there is a unique negative root which determines \( \beta^\ell \). Then, \( \{a^\ell, \beta^\ell, b^\ell\}_{\ell \in N_D} \) are uniquely determined. Let \( \vec{a} = [a^1, a^2, ..., a^{n_D}]^T \). From (A.6) we have

\[ \vec{a} = A^{-1} \vec{b}, \]

where \( A \) is a \( n_D \times n_D \) matrix where the element \( A_{ll} = b^l \gamma (n_D - 2) - \frac{1}{n_D - 1} n_i^l \beta^l \) for all \( l \neq \ell, l, \ell \in N_D, A^\ell = 0 \) for all \( \ell \in N_D, \) and \( B \) is a \( n_D \)-dimensional column vector where the element

\[ B_\ell = -b^\ell \gamma (n_D - 2) - \frac{1}{n_D - 1} \sum_{i \in N_D, i \neq \ell} n_i \frac{a_i^\ell b_i^\ell}{n_i \beta_i^\ell + b_i^\ell} \]

for all \( \ell \in N_D \).

Then,

\[ [I_{n_D} - A] \vec{a} = B, \]

where \( [I_{n_D} - A] \) is invertible. Thus, \( \vec{a} \) is uniquely determined.

**Characterization of price sensitivities**

The following two lemmas characterize the price sensitivities of investors and dealers in the local markets. We use these intermediate results in the proofs of the propositions in the main text.

**Lemma 6.** *(Characterization of \( \beta^\ell \))*. Investors’ price sensitivity \( \beta^\ell \in \left( -\frac{1}{\gamma}, 0 \right) \) satisfies: a) \( \frac{\partial \beta^\ell}{\partial n} < 0 \), b) \( \beta^\ell \equiv \lim_{n_D \to \infty} \beta^\ell \equiv -\frac{2(\ell^\ell - 1)}{\gamma(2n^\ell - 1)} \) and \( \lim_{n \to \infty} \beta^\ell = -\frac{1}{\gamma} \).

**Proof.** Recall that \( \beta(n, n_D) \) is defined by the negative root of

\[ H(\beta) = -2n (n - 1) (\gamma \beta)^2 + ((2n - 1) n_D - 2n (n - 2)) \gamma \beta + 2(n - 1) n_D. \quad \text{(A.7)} \]

\( \beta(n, n_D) \) is uniquely defined and \( H'(\beta(n, n_D)) > 0 \) since \( H(0) > 0 \), and \( H'' < 0 \). Also, \( \beta(n) > -\frac{1}{\gamma} \) since

\[ H\left(-\frac{1}{\gamma}\right) = -2n - n_D < 0. \]

a) Using the implicit function theorem we have

\[ \frac{\partial \beta(n, n_D)}{\partial n} = -\frac{\partial H(\beta)}{\partial n}|_{\beta(n, n_D)} \frac{\beta(n, n_D)}{H'(\beta(n, n_D))}. \]

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and, since $H'(\beta(n,n_D)) > 0$,
\[
sign \left( \frac{\partial \beta (n)}{\partial n} \right) = -sign \left( \frac{\partial H (\beta)}{\partial n} \bigg|_{\beta(n,n_D)} \right) = -sign (X),
\]
where
\[
\frac{\partial H (\beta)}{\partial n} \bigg|_{\beta(n,n_D)} = n_D - (2n - 1)(\gamma \beta(n,n_D))^2 + (n_D - 2(n - 1)) \beta(n,n_D) \gamma \tag{A.8}
\]
Since $H(\beta(n,n_D)) = 0$, using Equation (A.7) we have
\[
(\gamma \beta(n,n_D))^2 = \frac{(2n - 1) n_D - 2n(n - 2)) \gamma \beta(n,n_D) + 2(n - 1)n_D}{2n(n - 1)}.
\]
Then, using this expression in Equation (A.8) we have
\[
\frac{\partial H (\beta)}{\partial n} \bigg|_{\beta(n,n_D)} = -\frac{1}{2n(n - 1)} \left( (n_D (n - 1)^2 + (n_D + 2)n^2 \right) \gamma \beta(n,n_D) + 2n_D (n - 1)^2).
\]
Then,
\[
sign \left( \frac{\partial H (\beta)}{\partial n} \bigg|_{\beta(n,n_D)} \right) = \gamma \beta(n,n_D) - X,
\]
where
\[
X \equiv \frac{-2n_D(n - 1)^2}{(n_D(n - 1)^2 + (n_D + 2)n^2)}.
\]
Note that $\gamma \beta(n) < X$ because
\[
H(X) = \frac{2nD(n - 1)((2n^2 - 2n + 1)n_D^2 + 4n(n^2 - n + 1)n_D + 4n^2(n^2 - 2n + 2))}{(n_D(n - 1)^2 + (n_D + 2)n^2)^2} > 0
\]
for all $n \geq 1$ and for all $n_D \geq 0$. Therefore, $\frac{\partial H(\beta)}{\partial n} |_{\beta(n,n_D)} < 0$ which implies $\frac{\partial \beta(n,n_D)}{\partial n} < 0$.

b) Also, using the implicit function theorem we have
\[
\frac{\partial \beta(n,n_D)}{\partial n_D} = -\frac{\frac{\partial H(\beta)}{\partial n} |_{\beta(n,n_D)}}{H'(\beta(n,n_D))}
\]
and
\[
sign \left( \frac{\partial \beta(n,n_D)}{\partial n_D} \right) = -sign \left( \frac{\partial H (\beta)}{\partial n} \bigg|_{\beta(n,n_D)} \right),
\]
where
\[
\frac{\partial H (\beta)}{\partial n_D} \bigg|_{\beta(n,n_D)} = (2n - 1) \gamma \beta(n,n_D) + 2(n - 1).
\]
Note that $\gamma \beta(n) > -\frac{2(n - 1)}{(2n - 1)}$ because
\[
H \left( \frac{2(n - 1)}{2n - 1} \right) = -4\frac{n^2}{(2n - 1)^2} (n - 1) < 0,
\]
and, therefore, $\frac{\partial H(\beta)}{\partial n_D} |_{\beta(n)} > 0$, which implies
\[
\left( \frac{\partial \beta(n,n_D)}{\partial n_D} \right) < 0.
\]

c) Finally, from the definition of $\beta(n,n_D)$ we can write
\[
\beta(n,n_D) = -\frac{1 + \sqrt{1 + \frac{16(n - 1)^2n_D}{(2n - 1)n_D - 2n(n - 2)^2}}}{\gamma} - \frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \frac{4(n - 1)n_D}{(2n - 1)n_D - 2n(n - 2)^2} \right).
\]
Taking limits gives
\[
\lim_{n_D \to \infty} \beta(n,n_D) = -\frac{2(n - 1)}{\gamma(2n - 1)} \equiv \bar{\beta} \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{n \to \infty} \beta(n,n_D) = -\frac{1}{\gamma}.
\]
Lemma 7. \textbf{(Characterization of $b^\ell$)} Dealers' price sensitivity $b^\ell$ satisfy a) $\frac{\partial b^\ell}{\partial n^\ell} < 0$, b) $\frac{\partial b^\ell}{\partial n_D} < 0$, and c) $\lim_{n_D \to \infty} b^\ell = -\frac{2n^\ell(n^\ell - 1)}{\gamma(2n^\ell - 1)}$ and $\lim_{n^\ell \to \infty} b^\ell = -\frac{2n^\ell}{2\gamma}$.

Proof. Using the definition of $b^\ell$ in Equation (A.6) and Lemma 6 we have that

$$\frac{\partial b^\ell}{\partial n^\ell} = \frac{n^\ell}{(2\gamma n^\ell - n_D)^2} \left(n^\ell \beta^\ell \frac{\partial \beta^\ell}{\partial n^\ell} + \beta^\ell \right) < 0$$

and

$$\frac{\partial b^\ell}{\partial n_D} = -\frac{2 \left(n^\ell \beta^\ell\right)^2 \gamma + n^\ell n^\ell n_D}{(n_D - 2n^\ell \beta^\ell \gamma)^2} < 0,$$

which proves a) and b) in the lemma above.

Moreover, it also follows that

$$\lim_{n_D \to \infty} b^\ell = \lim_{n^\ell \to \infty} -\frac{n^\ell \beta^\ell}{2\gamma n^\ell \beta^\ell - n_D} - 1 = n^\ell \beta^\ell - 1 = -\frac{2n^\ell(n^\ell - 1)}{\gamma(2n^\ell - 1)}$$

and

$$\lim_{n^\ell \to \infty} b^\ell = \lim_{n^\ell \to \infty} -\frac{\beta^\ell n_D}{2\gamma \beta^\ell - \frac{n_D}{n^\ell}} = -\frac{n_D}{2\gamma},$$

which proves the statement in c).

Proof of Lemma 1

Consider a local market $\ell$. The first order condition in Equation (16) for the investor's optimization problem yields

$$X^i_1 (p_1^\ell; \theta^i) = \frac{\theta^i - p_1^\ell}{\gamma + v_1^\ell}.$$ 

Using that the inverse residual demand function of dealer $\ell$ in her local market, $p_1^\ell$, is implied by

$$\sum_{j \in N_{I}(\ell), j \neq i} X^j_1 (p_1^\ell; \theta^j) + q_1^\ell = 0,$$

we obtain that her price impact, $\lambda^\ell_1$, must satisfy the following equation

$$-\frac{n^\ell}{\gamma + v_1^\ell} \frac{\partial p_1^-}{\partial q_1^\ell} + 1 = 0,$$

or

$$\lambda^\ell_1 = \frac{\gamma + v_1^\ell}{n^\ell}.$$

Similarly, using that the inverse residual demand function for investor $i$ in market $\ell$, $p_1^{\ell,-i}$, is implied by

$$\sum_{j \in N_{I}(\ell), j \neq i} X^j_1 (p_1^\ell; \theta^j) + x_1^i + Q_1^\ell (p_1^\ell; \theta) = 0,$$

we obtain that his price impact, $v_1^\ell$, must satisfy the following equation

$$-\frac{n^\ell - 1}{\gamma + v_1^\ell} \frac{\partial p_1^{\ell,-i}}{\partial x_1^i} + 1 + \frac{\partial Q_1^\ell}{\partial x_1^i} = 0.$$  \hfill (A.9)

To evaluate $\frac{\partial Q_1^\ell}{\partial x_1^i}$ we need to determine the indirect effect of a change in $x_1^i$ on the expected price in the interdealer market. For this, we express the expected price in the interdealer market as a function of the price in the local market $p_1^\ell$. We proceed as follows.
As we show in the proof of Proposition 2, the first order condition in Equation (17) for the dealer’s optimization problem implies that

\[
Q_1^i (p_1^i; \theta) = \frac{(\gamma + \lambda_2^i)}{\gamma \lambda_2^i + \lambda_1^i (\gamma + \lambda_2^i)} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + \lambda_2^i} \mathbb{E} [p_2 | \theta, p_1^i] - p_1^i \right).
\]

(A.10)

Therefore, the market clearing condition in Equation (5) becomes

\[
\frac{(\gamma + \lambda_2^i)}{\gamma \lambda_2^i + \lambda_1^i (\gamma + \lambda_2^i)} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + \lambda_2^i} \mathbb{E} [p_2 | \theta, p_1^i] - p_1^i \right) - \frac{1}{\upsilon_1 + \gamma} \sum_{i \in N_{1(i)}} (\theta^i - p_1^i) = 0,
\]

which implies that the price in the local market \( \ell \) is

\[
p_1^\ell = \frac{1}{\gamma \lambda_2^\ell + \lambda_1^\ell (\gamma + \lambda_2^\ell)} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + \lambda_2^\ell} \mathbb{E} [p_2 | \theta, p_1^\ell] - \frac{1}{\upsilon_1 + \gamma} \sum_{i \in N_{1(\ell)}} (\theta^i - p_1^i) \right).
\]

Further, the price in the interdealer market is

\[
p_2 = -\frac{\sum_{i \in N_D} q_i}{n_D}
\]

and, substituting Equation (A.10), we obtain

\[
p_2 = -\frac{\gamma}{n_D} \sum_{i \in N_D} \lambda_1^i (\gamma + \lambda_2^i) \left( \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + \lambda_2^i} \mathbb{E} [p_2 | \theta, p_1^i] - \frac{1}{\upsilon_1 + \gamma} (\theta^i - p_1^i) \right),
\]

Taking expectations, we have that

\[
\mathbb{E} [p_2 | \theta] = -\frac{\gamma}{n_D} \sum_{i \in N_D} \lambda_1^i (\gamma + \lambda_2^i) \left( \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + \lambda_2^i} \mathbb{E} [p_2 | \theta, p_1^i] | \theta] - \mathbb{E} [p_1^i | \theta] \right),
\]

and

\[
\mathbb{E} [p_1^i | \theta] = \frac{1}{\gamma \lambda_2^i + \lambda_1^i (\gamma + \lambda_2^i)} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + \lambda_2^i} \mathbb{E} [p_2 | \theta, p_1^i] | \theta] - \frac{1}{\upsilon_1 + \gamma} (\theta^i - p_1^i) \right).
\]

It follows that

\[
\frac{(\gamma + \lambda_2^i)}{\gamma \lambda_2^i + \lambda_1^i (\gamma + \lambda_2^i)} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + \lambda_2^i} \mathbb{E} [p_2 | \theta, p_1^i] | \theta] - \mathbb{E} [p_1^i | \theta] \right) = -\frac{n_i}{\gamma + \upsilon_1} (\mathbb{E} [p_1^i | \theta] - \theta),
\]

(A.11)

which implies that

\[
\mathbb{E} [p_2 | \theta] = \frac{\gamma}{n_D} \sum_{i \in N_D} \frac{n_i}{\gamma + \upsilon_1} (\mathbb{E} [p_1^i | \theta] - \theta).
\]

Further, using that \( \mathbb{E} [p_2 | \theta, p_1^i] | \theta] = \mathbb{E} [p_2 | \theta, p_1^i] | \theta] \), we obtain

\[
\mathbb{E} [p_2 | \theta, p_1^i] = -\frac{\gamma}{n_D} \sum_{i \in N_D, i \neq \ell} \frac{(\gamma + \lambda_2^i)}{\gamma \lambda_2^i + \lambda_1^i (\gamma + \lambda_2^i)} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + \lambda_2^i} \mathbb{E} [p_2 | \theta, p_1^i] | \theta] - \mathbb{E} [p_1^i | \theta] \right)
\]

\[
-\frac{\gamma}{n_D} \frac{(\gamma + \lambda_2^\ell)}{\gamma \lambda_2^\ell + \lambda_1^\ell (\gamma + \lambda_2^\ell)} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + \lambda_2^\ell} \mathbb{E} [p_2 | \theta, p_1^\ell] - p_1^\ell \right).
\]

Using Equation (A.11), we have that
Lastly, we show in Lemma 10 that

That gives us that

Substituting back into Equation (A.10), we obtain that the demand function of a dealer in the local market is

Thus, we obtain that

Substituting this in Equation (6) we obtain that

Finally, using Lemmas 6 and 7 and the expressions for \( p_1^\ell \) and \( \lambda_1^\ell \) in Equation (A.3) we have that the price impacts satisfy the following properties

\[
\begin{align*}
a) \quad & \frac{\partial v_1}{\partial n_D} = \left( \frac{1}{(n^\ell - 1) \beta_1 + b_1} \right)^2 \left( \beta_1 + (n^\ell - 1) \frac{\partial \beta_1}{\partial n_D} + \frac{\partial b_1}{\partial n_D} \right) < 0, \\
b) \quad & \frac{\partial \beta_1}{\partial n_D} = \left( \frac{1}{n^\ell \beta_1} \right)^2 \left( \beta_1 + \frac{\partial \beta_1}{\partial n_D} \right) < 0, \\
c) \quad & \frac{\partial v_1}{\partial n} = \left( \frac{1}{(n^\ell - 1) \beta_1 + b_1} \right)^2 \left( (n^\ell - 1) \frac{\partial \beta_1}{\partial n} + \frac{\partial b_1}{\partial n} \right) < 0, \\
d) \quad & \frac{\partial \lambda_1^\ell}{\partial n_D} = \frac{1}{n^\ell (\beta_1^2) \partial n_D} < 0.
\end{align*}
\]

**Proof of Theorem 1**

Throughout this proof, we keep \( n_S \) fixed and set \( n_t = n_D n_S \). We prove the result in three steps. First, we show in Lemma 8 below that

\[
\lim_{n_D \to \infty} \Delta^i(\rho = 1; n_D) < 0, \tag{A.12}
\]

where \( \Delta^i \) has been defined in Equation (25). Second as we show in Lemma 9 below that

\[
\Delta^i(\rho = 1; n_D = 3) > 0. \tag{A.13}
\]

Lastly, we show in Lemma 10 that \( \Delta(\rho; n_D) \) is monotonically increasing in \( \rho \), i.e.,

\[
\frac{\partial \Delta^i(\rho; n_D)}{\partial \rho} > 0. \tag{A.14}
\]
First note that $\Delta^i(\rho; n_D)$ is continuous in $n_D$ and $\rho$. Then, using the intermediate value theorem (IVT) it follows from Equation (A.12) and Equation (A.13) that there exists a threshold $n_D^* > 3$ such that

$$\Delta^i(\rho = 1; n_D^*) = 0$$

and $\Delta^i(\rho = 1; n_D) > 0$ for all $n_D < n_D^*$. If there are multiple solutions to Equation (A.15), $n_D^*$ is given by the smallest solution. Moreover, using the IVT there exists a threshold $\rho^*(n_D)$ such that

$$\Delta^i(\rho^*(n_D); n_D) = 0.$$

From Equation (A.14) it follows that for all $n_D < n_D^*$ there exists a unique threshold $\rho^*(n_D)$ such that

$$\Delta^i(\rho; n_D) > 0 \quad \text{if and only if} \quad \rho > \rho^*(n_D).$$

Next, we present the proofs of the aiding lemmas. For the remainder of the appendix, we denote by $\beta(n, n_D)$ is the negative root of $H(\beta; n, n_D) = 0$ as defined in Equation (A.7). Similarly, $b(n, n_D)$ satisfies the system in Equations (A.6).

**Lemma 8.** If investor valuations are perfectly correlated, an investor has incentives to deviate if the interdealer market is competitive, i.e.,

$$\lim_{n_D \to \infty} \Delta^i(\rho = 1; n_D) < 0.$$

**Proof.** From the definition of $\Delta^i$ in Equation (25) we have

$$\Delta^i(\rho = 1; n_D) = -\left(\frac{\beta^{sym}(1 + z \beta^{dev})(n_S \beta^{sym} + b^{dev} + \lim_{n_D \to \infty} a^{sym})^2 - \beta^{dev}(1 + z \beta^{dev})(n_S \beta^{sym} + b^{dev} + \lim_{n_D \to \infty} a^{dev})^2}{(2 n_S \beta^{sym})^2}\right) \sigma_g^2,$$

where

$$\beta^{sym} = \beta(n_S, n_D) \quad \text{and} \quad \beta^{dev} = \beta(n_S + 1, n_D),$$

and $a^{sym}$ and $a^{dev}$ are as defined in Equations (A.6) and (C.2), respectively. Then,

$$\lim_{n_D \to \infty} \Delta^i(1; n_D) = -\left(\frac{1}{2 - \gamma \beta^{sym} n_S}\right)^2 \frac{4 n_S}{(4 n_S^2 - 1)^2} \sigma_g^2 < 0,$$

where we used that

$$\beta^{sym} = \lim_{n_D \to \infty} \beta(n_S) = -\frac{2(n_S - 1)}{\gamma(2 n_S - 1)} \quad \text{and} \quad \beta^{dev} = \lim_{n_D \to \infty} \beta(n_S + 1) = -\frac{2 n_S}{\gamma(2 n_S + 1)}.$$

**Lemma 9.** If investor valuations are perfectly correlated, an investor has no incentives to deviate if there are three active dealers, i.e.,

$$\Delta^i(\rho = 1; n_D = 3) > 0.$$
Proof. Let $b^{\text{sym}} = b(n_S, n_D = 3)$, $b^{\text{dev}} = b(n_S + 1, n_D = 3)$ and $b^\ell = b(n_S - 1, n_D = 3)$. From the definition of $\Delta^i$ in Equation (25) we have

$$
\Delta^i (\rho = 1; n_D = 3) = \lim_{n_D \to 3} \frac{\beta^{\text{sym}} + a^{\text{sym}}}{(n_S \beta^{\text{sym}} + b^{\text{sym}})^2} \left( b^{\text{sym}} + a^{\text{sym}} \right)^2 - \frac{\beta^{\text{dev}} (1 + \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta^{\text{dev}})}{(n_S + 1) \beta^{\text{dev}} + b^{\text{dev}})^2} \left( b^{\text{dev}} + a^{\text{dev}} \right)^2 \right) \sigma^2 \theta,
$$

where we used that

$$
a^{\text{sym}} = \frac{\gamma^2 (b^{\text{sym}})^2}{\gamma b^{\text{sym}} + 6} \quad \text{and} \quad n^{\ell} b^{\text{sym}} = \frac{3b^{\text{sym}}}{(2\gamma b^{\text{sym}} + 3)},
$$

From Lemma 19 in the Online Appendix we know that

$$
- \frac{4\gamma b^{\text{sym}} n_S + 6n_S + 3b^{\text{sym}}}{n_S (\gamma b^{\text{sym}} + 6)^2} b^{\text{sym}} + \frac{4\gamma (n_S + 1) b^{\text{dev}} + 6 (n_S + 1) + 3\beta^{\text{dev}}}{(n_S + 1) \beta^{\text{dev}} + 6 (n_S + 1) + 3\beta^{\text{dev}}} b^{\text{dev}} > 0
$$

(A.16)

and from Lemma 20 in the Online Appendix we have

$$
\frac{n_S + 1}{n_S} > \left( \frac{(\gamma b^{\text{dev}} + 6)}{(2\gamma b^{\text{dev}} + 6) \left( 1 + \frac{a^{\text{dev}}}{b^{\text{dev}}} \right) \sigma^2 \theta} > 0.
$$

(A.17)

Then, from Equation (A.16) we have

$$
- \frac{4\gamma b^{\text{sym}} n_S + 6n_S + 3b^{\text{sym}}}{n_S^2 (\gamma b^{\text{sym}} + 6)^2} b^{\text{sym}} (n_S + 1) + \frac{4\gamma (n_S + 1) b^{\text{dev}} + 6 (n_S + 1) + 3\beta^{\text{dev}}}{n_S (\gamma b^{\text{dev}} + 6)^2} b^{\text{dev}} > 0
$$

and using Equation (A.17) it follows that

$$
\Delta^i (\rho = 1; n_D = 3, n_S) > 0.
$$

\[\square\]

**Lemma 10.** $\Delta^i$ is monotonically increasing in $\rho$, i.e., $\frac{\partial \Delta^i(\rho_{n_D})}{\partial \rho} > 0$.

**Proof.** From the definition of $\Delta^i$ we have

$$
\frac{\partial \Delta^i(\rho; n_D, n_S)}{\partial \rho} = \frac{L(n_S + 1) - L(n_S)}{\partial n},
$$

where

$$
L(n) \equiv -\frac{1}{2} \beta (n) (\gamma \beta (n) + 2) \left( \frac{b(n) + (n - 1) \beta (n)}{b(n) + n \beta (n)} \right)^2 + (n - 1) \left( \frac{\beta (n)}{b(n) + n \beta (n)} \right)^2
$$

$$
= -\frac{1}{2} \beta (n) (\gamma \beta (n) + 2) \left( 1 - \frac{\beta (n)}{b(n) + n \beta (n)} \right) \beta (n) b(n) > 0.
$$

Taking the derivative with respect to $n$ we have

$$
\frac{\partial L(n)}{\partial n} > 0
$$

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because from Lemma 21 in the Online Appendix we have that \( 1 - \frac{\beta(n)}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))^2} \) is increasing in \( n \), from Lemma 23 we know - \( \frac{\beta(n)}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))} \) is increasing in \( n \), and
\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial n} \left( -\frac{1}{2} \beta(n) (\gamma \beta(n) + 2) \right) = -\left( \beta(n) \gamma + 1 \right) \frac{\partial \beta(n)}{\partial n} > 0,
\]
because \( 0 > \beta(n) > -\frac{1}{\gamma} \) and \( \frac{\partial \beta}{\partial n} < 0 \) from Lemma 6. Then, \( L(n_S + 1) - L(n_S) > 0 \).

**Proof of Proposition 3**

The proof follows from Lemma 8 which shows that
\[
\lim_{n_D \to \infty} \Delta^i(\rho = 1; n_D) < 0,
\]
and Lemma 10 which shows that \( \Delta^i(\rho; n_D) \) is monotonically increasing in \( \rho \). This implies that
\[
\Delta^i(\rho; n_D) < \Delta^i(\rho = 1; n_D)
\]
for any \( \rho < 1 \). Taking the limit as \( n_D \to \infty \), we obtain that
\[
\lim_{n_D \to \infty} \Delta^i(\rho; n_D) < 0.
\]

**Proof of Proposition 4**

At date 0, when investor \( i \) chooses a dealer with whom to trade, her expected payoff in a symmetric market structure \( m_{n_S} \) with no interdealer market is given by
\[
V_{1}^i(m_{n_S}) = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \theta^i x_1^i - \frac{\gamma}{2} (x_1^i)^2 - p_1^i x_1^i \right],
\]
where \( x_1^i \) is the quantity of the asset the investor purchases at the price \( p_1^i \) when the investor’s prior is \( \theta^i \) and follows from Equation (19) with \( v_1^i = \frac{2}{n_{S-1}} \). The equilibrium price \( p_1^\ell \) is given by
\[
p_1^\ell = \frac{\sum_{i \in N_I(t)} \theta^i}{n_S + 1}.
\]
Substituting the quantity that the investor trades in equilibrium into her expected payoff we obtain
\[
V_{1}^i (m_{n_S}) = \frac{1}{2\gamma} \left( \frac{(n_S)^2 - 1}{(n_S)^2} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ (\theta^i - p_1^\ell)^2 \right] \right),
\]
which can be written as
\[
V_{1}^i (m_{n_S}) = \frac{1}{2\gamma} \left( \frac{\sigma_{\theta}^2 + \sigma_{\eta}^2}{(n_S)^2} \right) \frac{n_S - 1}{n_S + 1} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ (\theta^i - p_1^\ell)^2 \right] \frac{n_S (n_S + 1) (1 - \rho) + 2\rho - 1}{(n_S + 1)^2}.
\]
In the case of no interdealer market, a symmetric market structure \( m_{n_S} \) is stable if
\[
V_{1}^i (m_{n_S}) - V_{1}^i (m_{n_S+1}) = -\frac{1}{2\gamma} \left( \frac{\sigma_{\theta}^2 + \sigma_{\eta}^2}{(n_S)^2} \right) \left( (n_S^3 + 5n_S^2 + n_S - 2) - (n_S^3 + 7n_S^2 - 4) \rho \right) \geq 0
\]
or when
\[
\rho \geq \frac{n_S^3 + 5n_S^2 + n_S - 2}{n_S^3 + 7n_S^2 - 4} \equiv \hat{\rho}(n_S).
\]
Note that
\[
\frac{n_S^3 + 5n_S^2 + n_S - 2}{n_S^3 + 7n_S^2 - 4} < 1
\]
for all \( n_S \geq 2 \).
**Asymmetric market structures with no interdealer market**

In a perfectly competitive local market, an investor’s utility is given by

\[
\lim_{\ell \to \infty} V^i_\ell (m, n^\ell) = \frac{1}{2\gamma} \sigma_\eta^2,
\]

where \(V^i_\ell (m, n^\ell)\) is defined in Equation (30). Then, for a market structure with \(n_D\) dealers in which \(n_D - 1\) dealers have \(n^\ell = x\) investors and one dealer has a perfectly competitive market, i.e., \(n^\ell \to \infty\) to be sustained in equilibrium it has to be the case that

\[
V^i_\ell (m, x) > \frac{1}{2\gamma} \sigma_\eta^2 > V^i_\ell (m, x + 1),
\]

which is the same as

\[
\frac{(x + 1)^2 + 2(x + 1) - 1}{(x + 1)^2 + 3(x + 1) - 2} > \frac{x^2 + 2x - 1}{x^2 + 3x - 2},
\]

where we used that

\[
V^i_\ell (m, n^\ell) = \frac{1}{2\gamma} (\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\eta^2) \left(\frac{n^\ell - 1}{n^\ell + 1}\right) (1 - \rho) + 2\rho - 1,
\]

and \(\rho = \frac{\sigma_\theta^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\eta^2}\).

**Characterization of equilibrium in a centralized market**

The first order condition for an investor \(i \in N_I\) in a centralized market is given by

\[
(\theta^i - p_c) - \left(\gamma + \frac{\partial p_c, -i}{\partial x^i_c}\right) x^i_c = 0,
\]

where \(p_c, -i\) is the inverse residual demand of investors \(i\) implied by

\[
\sum_{j \in N_I, j \neq i} X^j_c (p_c; \theta^j) + \sum_{l \in N_D} Q^l_c (p_c; \theta) + x^i_c = 0.
\]

The first order condition for a dealer \(\ell \in N_D\) in a centralized market is given by

\[
-p_c - \left(\gamma + \frac{\partial p_c, -\ell}{\partial q^\ell_c}\right) q^\ell_c = 0,
\]

where \(p_c, -\ell\) is the inverse residual demand of dealer \(\ell\) implied by

\[
\sum_{j \in N_I} X^j_c (p_c; \theta^j) + \sum_{l \in N_D, l \neq \ell} Q^l_c (p_c; \theta) + q^\ell_c = 0.
\]

The demand functions for investors and dealers implied by these first order conditions are, respectively,

\[
X^i_c (p_c; \theta^i) = \frac{\theta^i - p_c}{\gamma + \lambda^i_c} \quad \text{and} \quad Q^\ell_c (p_c; \theta) = -\frac{p_c}{\gamma + \lambda^\ell_c},
\]

where \(\lambda^i_c = \frac{\partial p_c, -i}{\partial x^i_c}\) and \(\lambda^\ell_c = \frac{\partial p_c, -\ell}{\partial q^\ell_c}\) are the price impacts of investors and dealers in the centralized markets.

In an equilibrium in linear strategies we conjecture and subsequently verify that the demand functions of investors and dealers are given by

\[
X^i_c (p_c; \theta^i) = \alpha^c \theta^i + \beta^c p_c \quad \text{and} \quad Q^\ell_c (p_c; \theta) = b^c p_c.
\]

Matching coefficients we have

\[
\alpha^c = -\beta^c = \frac{1}{\gamma + \lambda^i_c} \quad \text{and} \quad b^c = -\frac{1}{\gamma + \lambda^\ell_c},
\]

(A.18)
Market clearing implies that the equilibrium price in the centralized market is given by

\[ p_c = -\frac{\alpha^c \sum_{j \in N_I} \theta^j}{n_I \beta^c + n_D b^c} \]

and the price impacts given by

\[ \lambda_c^i = \frac{1}{(n_I - 1) \beta^c + n_D b^c} \quad \text{and} \quad \lambda_c^i = \frac{1}{n_I \beta^c + (n_D - 1) b^c}. \tag{A.19} \]

The expected utility of an investor

\[ V_i^1 (m, n_S, \rho) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \theta^i x_1^i - \frac{\gamma}{2} (x_1^i)^2 - p_1^i x_1^i \right], \tag{A.20} \]

where the price impacts given by

\[ \lambda_c^i = \lambda_c^i = \frac{\gamma}{n_I + n_D - 2} \]

and the price is

\[ p_c = \frac{\sum_{j \in N_I} \theta^j}{n_I + n_D}. \]

**Proof of Lemma 4**

The expected utility of an investor \( i \) in local market \( \ell \) in a symmetric market structure is

\[ V_i^1 (m_n, \rho) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \theta^i x_1^i - \frac{\gamma}{2} (x_1^i)^2 - p_1^i x_1^i \right], \tag{A.20} \]

where \( x_1^i \) and \( p_1^i \) are the equilibrium quantity acquired by investor \( i \) and the equilibrium price in local market \( \ell \), respectively. In this case \( n_\ell = n_S \forall \ell \in N_D \).

The equilibrium price in local market \( \ell \) is

\[ p_1^\ell = \pi_0 \theta + \pi_\eta \sum_{i \in N^\ell} \eta^i, \]

where

\[ \pi_0 = -\frac{n^\ell \alpha^\ell + \alpha^\ell}{n^\ell \beta^\ell + b^\ell} \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_\eta = \frac{\beta^\ell}{n^\ell \beta^\ell + b^\ell}. \tag{A.21} \]

Using the equilibrium linear strategies, we have

\[ \mathbb{E} \left[ (x_1^\ell)^2 \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[ (\alpha^\ell \theta^i + \beta^\ell p_1^i)^2 \right] = \frac{\beta^\ell (a^\ell + b^\ell)}{n^\ell \beta^\ell + b^\ell} \sigma^2_\theta - \frac{(n^\ell - 1) \beta^\ell + b^\ell}{n^\ell \beta^\ell + b^\ell} \beta^\ell \sigma^2_\eta, \]

and

\[ \mathbb{E} \left[ p_1^i x_1^i \right] = \pi_0 (\alpha^\ell + \beta^\ell \pi_\eta) \sigma^2_\theta + \pi_\eta (\alpha^\ell + \beta^\ell \pi_\eta) \sigma^2_\eta. \]

Then, Equation (A.20) becomes

\[ V_i^1 (m_n; \rho) = -\beta^\ell \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta^\ell + 1 \right) \frac{1}{(n^\ell \beta^\ell + b^\ell)^2} \left( (a^\ell + b^\ell)^2 + ((n^\ell - 1) \beta^\ell + b^\ell)^2 + (n^\ell - 1) \beta^2 \right) \frac{1 - \rho}{\rho} \sigma^2_\eta \tag{A.22} \]

Since \( \beta^\ell \) and \( b^\ell \) do not depend on \( \rho \), and \( \beta^\ell \in \left( -\frac{1}{\gamma}, 0 \right) \), we have that

\[ \frac{\partial V_i^1 (m; \rho)}{\partial \rho} = \beta^\ell \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta^\ell + 1 \right) \frac{(n^\ell - 1) \beta^\ell + b^\ell)^2 + (n^\ell - 1) \beta^2}{(n^\ell \beta^\ell + b^\ell)^2} \frac{1}{\rho^2} < 0. \]
Proof of Proposition 5

Investor welfare can be rewritten as

\[
V_i^1 (m; \rho) = -\beta^c \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta^c + 1 \right) \left( (1 - \pi_\Theta) \right)^2 + \left( (1 - \pi_\eta)^2 + \pi_\eta^2 (n^c - 1) \right) \frac{1 - \beta^c}{\beta^c} \sigma_\Theta^2
\]  

(A.23)

where \( \pi_\Theta \) and \( \pi_\eta \) are such that

\[
p_1 = \pi_\Theta \theta + \pi_\eta \sum_{j \in N^e} \eta^j.
\]

Let \( \Delta V^i = \mathbb{E} (V^{i,c}) - \mathbb{E} (V^i) \) be the difference between an investor's welfare in a centralized market with \( n_D \) dealers and a symmetric fragmented market with \( n_D \) dealers. The proof follows directly from Lemma 12 and Lemma 13 below. These lemmas use the following intermediate result.

Lemma 11. (Price function coefficients) The price function loading on the average idiosyncratic priors in a symmetric market structure is higher than that of a centralized market, i.e., \( \pi_\eta^e > \pi_\eta^c \)

Proof. Using the definition of the price coefficients in Equation (A.21) we have

\[
\frac{\pi_\eta^e}{\pi_\eta^c} > \frac{1}{n_S 2n_D - 2\beta^s \gamma n_S} \quad \text{and} \quad \beta^s \gamma n_S < \frac{n_D (n_D - 2) n_S + n_D^2}{2((n_D - 1) n_S + n_D)}
\]

which always holds since \( \beta^s < 0 \) and the right hand side of this expression is positive. \( \square \)

Lemma 12. Investors are better off in a centralized market structure as \( \rho \) approaches 1, i.e., \( \lim_{\rho \to 1} \Delta V^i > 0 \)

Proof. Using the definition of \( \Delta V^i \) and taking limits as \( \rho \to 1 \) we have

\[
\lim_{\rho \to 1} \Delta V^i = -\beta^c \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta^c + 1 \right) \left( \frac{n_D}{n_I + n_D} \right)^2 - \left( -\beta^s \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta^s + 1 \right) \right) \left( -\frac{1}{\beta^s \gamma n_S - 2} \right)^2.
\]

This limit can be rewritten as

\[
\lim_{\rho \to 1} \Delta V^i = \left( \beta^s \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta^s + 1 \right) - \beta^c \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta^c + 1 \right) \right) \left( -\frac{1}{\gamma^s \beta^s n_S - 2} \right)^2 - \beta^c \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta^c + 1 \right) \left( \frac{n_D}{n_I + n_D} \right)^2 - \left( -\frac{1}{\gamma^s \beta^s n_S - 2} \right)^2.
\]

(A.24)

The first term in Equation (A.24) is positive because

\[
\beta^s > \beta^c \quad \text{and from Lemma 14 we have} \quad \beta^s > \beta^c.
\]

Also,

\[
\frac{1}{n_S + 1} > \frac{1 - \beta^s \gamma n_S}{2 - \beta^s \gamma n_S} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \beta^s \gamma < \frac{-n_S - 1}{n_S}
\]

since \( H \left( -\frac{n_S - 1}{\gamma n_S} \right) = \frac{1}{n_S} (n_S - 1) (n_D - 2) > 0 \) and the second term is positive, which implies \( \lim_{\rho \to 1} \Delta V^i > 0 \). \( \square \)

Lemma 13. \( \Delta V^i \) is monotonically decreasing in \( \rho \), i.e., \( \frac{\partial \Delta V^i}{\partial \rho} < 0 \) for all \( \rho \).
Proof. From the definition of $\Delta V^i$ we have

$$
\frac{\partial \Delta V^i}{\partial \rho} = \left( \beta^c \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta^c + 1 \right) \left( (1 - \pi^c)^2 + (\pi^c)^2 (n_I - 1) \right) - \beta^s \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta^s + 1 \right) \left( (1 - \pi^s)^2 + (\pi^s)^2 (n_S - 1) \right) \right) \frac{1}{\rho^2} \sigma_g^2. 
(A.25)
$$

Since $\beta^c$, $\beta^s$, $\pi^c$ and $\pi^s$ are independent of $\rho$, monotonicity follows from Equation (A.25). Note that

$$
\text{sign} \left[ \frac{\partial \Delta V^i}{\partial \rho} \right] = \text{sign} \left[ \beta^c \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta^c + 1 \right) \left( (1 - \pi^c)^2 + (\pi^c)^2 (n_I - 1) \right) - \beta^s \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta^s + 1 \right) \left( (1 - \pi^s)^2 + (\pi^s)^2 (n_S - 1) \right) \right]
$$

where

$$\pi^s = \frac{\beta^s}{n_S \beta^s + b^s} = \frac{1}{n_S} \frac{n_D - 2 \beta^s \gamma n_S}{2n_D - 2 \beta^s \gamma n_S} \quad \text{and} \quad \pi^c = \frac{1}{n_I + n_D}.$$

Rewriting the right hand side of Equation (A.26) we have

$$
\text{sign} \left[ \frac{\partial \Delta V^i}{\partial \rho} \right] = \text{sign} \left[ (\beta^c \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta^c + 1 \right) - \beta^s \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta^s + 1 \right)) \left( (1 - \pi^c)^2 + (\pi^c)^2 (n_I - 1) \right) - \beta^s \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta^s + 1 \right) \left( (1 - \pi^s)^2 + (\pi^s)^2 (n_S - 1) \right) \right].
$$

The first term is negative since $\frac{\partial (\beta \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} \beta + 1 \right))}{\partial \beta} > 0$ and from Lemma 14 below we have $\beta^s > \beta^c$.

From Lemma 11 below we know that $\pi^s > \pi^c$. Let

$$
\Omega (x) \equiv (1 - x)^2 + x^2 (n_S - 1).
$$

Then

$$
\Omega' (x) = -2 (1 - x) + 2x (n_S - 1) = 2 (xn_S - 1).
$$

Since $\pi^s n_S < 1$ and $n_S \pi^c < 1$ we have that $\Omega' (x) < 0$ for all $x$ in $[\pi^s, \pi^c]$. Since

$$
(1 - \pi^c)^2 + (\pi^c)^2 (n_I - 1) - (1 - \pi^s)^2 + (\pi^s)^2 (n_S - 1) = (1 - \pi^s)^2 + (\pi^s)^2 (n_S - 1) - (1 - \pi^c)^2 + (\pi^c)^2 (n_I - 1) = \Omega (\pi^s) - \Omega (\pi^c) - \pi^c \pi^c n_S (n_D - 1) < 0
$$

we have $\frac{\partial \Delta V^i}{\partial \rho} < 0$.

Lemma 14. \textbf{(Price sensitivities in fragmented and centralized markets)} Investors are more sensitive to the price in a centralized market than in a fragmented market structure, i.e., $\beta^c < \beta^s$.

Proof. Note that

$$
\beta^c = \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{n_I + n_D - 2}{n_I + n_D - 1} < \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{n_I - 1}{n_I}.
$$

Since $\beta^s$ is given by $H \left( \beta^s \right) = 0$ where

$$
H (\beta) = -2n (n - 1) (\gamma \beta)^2 + ((2n - 1) n_D - 2n (n - 2)) \gamma \beta + 2 (n - 1) n_D.
$$

and

$$
H \left( \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{n_I - 1}{n_I} \right) = -\frac{1}{n_S n_D^2} (2n^2 \gamma n_D (n_D - 1) + n_S n_D^2 (n_D - 2) + 2 (n_S - 1) + n^2_D) < 0,
$$

we have $\beta^s > \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{n_I - 1}{n_I} > \beta^c$ because $\beta^c < 0, H'' < 0$ and $H (0) > 0$. \qed
Proof of Lemma 5

The expected utility of a dealer $\ell$ in a symmetric market structure is

$$W_D^\ell = -\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{\gamma}{2} (q_1^\ell + q_2^\ell)^2 + p_1^\ell q_1^\ell + p_2 q_2^\ell\right],$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.27)

where $q_1^\ell$ and $q_2^\ell$ are the equilibrium quantities acquired by the dealer in the local and interdealer markets, respectively, and $p_1$ and $p_2$ are the equilibrium prices in these markets.

Using the coefficients for the equilibrium linear strategies in Equations (A.6), we have

$$\mathbb{E}\left[(q_1^\ell + q_2^\ell)^2\right] = \mathbb{E}\left[\left(\frac{2}{n_D} q_1^\ell + \frac{(n_D - 2)}{n_D} \sum_{l \in N_D, l \neq \ell} q_1^l\right)^2\right]$$

$$= \left(a^\ell + b^\ell \pi_\eta^2\right) \sigma_\theta^2 + \left(\frac{2}{n_D} b^\ell \pi_\eta\right)^2 n^\ell \sigma_\eta^2 + \left(\frac{(n_D - 2)}{n_D} b^\ell \pi_\eta\right)^2 \frac{n^\ell \sigma_\eta^2}{n_D - 1}$$

$$= \left(\frac{n^\ell \beta^\ell}{b^\ell + n^\ell \beta^\ell} (a^\ell + b^\ell)\right)^2 \sigma_\theta^2 + \left(\frac{\beta^\ell}{n^\ell \beta^\ell + b^\ell}\right)^2 \frac{n^\ell \sigma_\eta^2}{n_D - 1}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.28)

Then, Equation (A.27) becomes

$$V_D(m_n, \rho) = \left(\frac{n^\ell \beta^\ell}{b^\ell + n^\ell \beta^\ell}\right)^2 \left(\frac{-\gamma}{2} (a^\ell + b^\ell) + \frac{(n^\ell \alpha^\ell + a^\ell)}{n^\ell \beta^\ell}\right) (a^\ell + b^\ell) - \left(1 + \frac{\gamma}{2} \frac{1}{n_D - 1} b^\ell \frac{b^\ell}{n_D} \frac{1 - \rho}{\rho}\right) \sigma_\theta^2.\hspace{1cm} (A.29)$$

In a centralized market

$$V_D(m_{nI}, \rho) = \frac{1}{2} \frac{n_I \left(n_I + n_D - 2\right)}{(n_I + n_D)^2} \left(n_I + \frac{1 - \rho}{\rho}\right) \sigma_\theta^2$$

In a fragmented symmetric market structure, using the expression for welfare in Equation (A.28) we have

$$\frac{\partial V_D}{\partial \rho} = \left(\frac{n^\ell \beta^\ell}{b^\ell + n^\ell \beta^\ell}\right)^2 \left(1 + \frac{\gamma}{2} \frac{1}{n_D - 1} b^\ell \frac{b^\ell}{n_D} \frac{1 - \rho}{\rho}\right) < 0,$$

because

$$\left(1 + \frac{\gamma}{2} \frac{1}{n_D - 1} b^\ell\right) = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{n_D - 1} \frac{n^\ell \beta^\ell}{n_D} - \frac{n^\ell \beta^\ell n_D}{2(n_D - 1)(n_D - 2n^\ell \beta^\ell)} > 0$$

since $n_D \geq 3$. In a centralized market structure, using the dealer’s welfare in Equation (A.29) we have

$$\frac{\partial V_D}{\partial \rho} = -\frac{1}{2} \frac{n_I - 1}{n_I} \frac{1}{\rho^2} \frac{n_I}{n_I} \sigma_\theta^2 < 0.$$
Proof of Proposition 6

Let \( \Delta V^D \equiv \mathbb{E} (V^{\ell,c}) - \mathbb{E} (V^f) \). Since \( \beta^s \) is independent of \( \rho \), \( \Delta V^D \) is a continuous monotone function of \( \rho \). From Lemma 15 and Lemma 16 below we have

\[
\lim_{\rho \to 1} \Delta V^D = \mathbb{E} (V^{\ell,c}) - \mathbb{E} (V^f) > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{\rho \to 0} \Delta V^D = \mathbb{E} (V^{\ell,c}) - \mathbb{E} (V^f) < 0
\]

which gives the result.

Lemma 15. When investors have common priors we have

\[
\lim_{\rho \to 1} \Delta V^D > 0.
\]

Proof. When investors have common priors and \( \rho \to 1 \) we have

\[
\lim_{\rho \to 1} \Delta V^D = \frac{1}{2\gamma} \left( \frac{n_2^2 (n_I + n_D - 2)}{(n_I + n_D - 1)^2 (n_I + n_D)} - \frac{n_S \gamma \beta^s}{\beta^s \gamma n_S - 2} \right) \sigma_\theta^2 > 0
\]

because

\[
\frac{n_2^2 (n_I + n_D - 2)}{(n_I + n_D - 1)^2 (n_I + n_D)} > \frac{n_S \gamma \beta^s}{\beta^s \gamma n_S - 2}.
\]

To see this note that

\[
\frac{n_2^2 (n_I + n_D - 2)}{(n_I + n_D - 1)^2 (n_I + n_D)} = \frac{n_S \gamma}{(n_S - 1) (n_D - 2)} > 0.
\]

Then,

\[
\frac{1}{2\gamma} \left( \frac{n_2^2 (n_I + n_D - 2)}{(n_I + n_D - 1)^2 (n_I + n_D)} - \frac{n_S \gamma \beta^s}{\beta^s \gamma n_S - 2} \right) > \frac{n_S \gamma \beta^s}{\beta^s \gamma n_S - 2}.
\]

and, because

\[
\frac{1}{2\gamma} \left( \frac{n_2^2 (n_I + n_D - 2)}{(n_I + n_D - 1)^2 (n_I + n_D)} - \frac{n_S \gamma}{(n_S - 1) \gamma n_S - 2} \right) = \frac{n_S \gamma}{n_S - 1} (n_D - 1) (n_S + n_D + n_S n_D - 1) > 0
\]

it follows that \( \lim_{\rho \to 1} \Delta V^D > 0 \).

Lemma 16. Dealers are better off in fragmented markets as the correlation in investor valuations disappears, i.e.

\[
\lim_{\rho \to 0} \Delta V^D < 0.
\]

Proof. Note that

\[
sign \left( \lim_{\rho \to 0} \Delta V^D \right) = \frac{1}{2} \gamma \beta^s \left( \frac{2 (n_D - 1) - \frac{1}{2} n_D}{(n_D - \beta^s \gamma n_S)^2} \right) \frac{n_D}{n_D - 1}
\]

where

\[
\frac{\partial R}{\partial x} (x, n_D, n_S) = \frac{1}{2} \frac{n_2^2}{(n_D - x n_S)^3 (n_D - 1)} ((2n_D - 3) n_S x - n_D (n_D - 1)) < 0 \quad \text{for all} \quad x < 0.
\]
Then, since \( -(\frac{n_{S}-1}{n_{S}}) > \gamma \beta \)

\[
R(\gamma \beta, n_{D}, n_{S}) > R\left(-\frac{(n_{S}-1)}{n_{S}}, n_{D}, n_{S}\right) = \frac{1}{n_{S}}(n_{S}-1) \frac{n_{D}(n_{D}-1)+(n_{S}-1)\left(\frac{3}{2}n_{D}-2\right)}{(n_{S}+n_{D}-1)^{3}} > 0.
\]

Also,

\[
\frac{\partial R}{\partial n_{D}}\left(-\frac{(n_{S}-1)}{n_{S}}, n_{D}, n_{S}\right) = \frac{1}{2} \frac{(n_{S}-1)(n_{S}+1)}{n_{S}} \frac{3n_{S}+D-3}{(n_{S}+n_{D}-1)^{3}} > 0.
\]

Then,

\[
R\left(-\frac{(n_{S}-1)}{n_{S}}, n_{D}, n_{S}\right) > R\left(-\frac{(n_{S}-1)}{n_{S}}, 3, n_{S}\right) = \frac{4}{3} \frac{n_{S}}{3n_{S}+1} \frac{3n_{S}+1}{(3n_{S}+2)^{2}}.
\]

Let

\[
R(n_{D}, n_{S}) := \frac{n_{S}((n_{S}+1)n_{D}-2)}{(n_{S}+1)n_{D}-1}^{3}(n_{D}+n_{S}n_{D}-3) < 0.
\]

Then,

\[
L(n_{D}, n_{S}) < L(3, n_{S}) = \frac{4}{3} \frac{n_{S}}{3n_{S}+1} \frac{3n_{S}+1}{(3n_{S}+2)^{2}}.
\]

Since, as shown in Lemma 17 below

\[
L(3, n_{S}) < R\left(-\frac{(n_{S}-1)}{n_{S}}, 3, n_{S}\right)
\]

we have

\[
L(n_{D}, n_{S}) < L(3, n_{S}) < R\left(-\frac{(n_{S}-1)}{n_{S}}, 3, n_{S}\right) < R\left(-\frac{(n_{S}-1)}{n_{S}}, n_{D}, n_{S}\right) < R(\gamma \beta, n_{D}, n_{S})
\]

for all \( n_{D} \geq 3 \), which implies

\[
\lim_{\rho \to 0} \Delta V^{\rho} < 0.
\]

\( \square \)

**Lemma 17.**

\[
L(3, n_{S}) < R\left(-\frac{(n_{S}-1)}{n_{S}}, 3, n_{S}\right).
\]

**Proof.** We have

\[
L(3, n_{S}) - R\left(-\frac{(n_{S}-1)}{n_{S}}, 3, n_{S}\right) = -\frac{1}{6} \frac{(111n_{S}^{3} - 317)n_{S}^{2} + (265n_{S}^{3} - 312)n_{S} + (49n_{S}^{3} - 84)}{n_{S}(n_{S}+1)(n_{S}+2)^{2}(3n_{S}+2)^{2}} < 0,
\]

for all \( n_{S} \geq 3 \).

**Proof of Lemma 2**

Volume in the interdealer market in a fragmented symmetric market structure is

\[
\mathcal{V}_{D} = \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=1}^{n_{D}} \left| q_{t}^{l} - q_{t}^{'(1)} \right| \right] = \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=1}^{n_{D}} \frac{(n_{D}-2)}{(n_{D}-1)} \left( \sum_{t \in N_{D}} q_{t}^{l} - q_{t}^{'(1)} \right) \right],
\]

where

\[
q_{t}^{'(1)} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \sigma_{q_{t}}^{2}\right).
\]
with
\[ \sigma^2_{q_2^l} = \frac{(n_D - 2)^2}{(n_D - 1)n_D} \left( \frac{b_l^f \beta^l}{n_S \beta^l + b_l^f} \right)^2 n_S \frac{1 - \rho \sigma^2_{\theta}}{\rho}, \]
since
\[ q_2^l = \frac{(n_D - 2)}{(n_D - 1)} \left( \frac{\sum_{i \in N_0} q_i^l}{n_D} - q_1^l \right) = \frac{(n_D - 2)}{(n_D - 1)} b_l^f \left( \frac{\sum_{i \in N_D} (p_i^l - p_i^1)}{n_D} \right) \]
\[ = \frac{(n_D - 2)}{(n_D - 1)} \frac{b_l^f \beta^l}{n_S \beta^l + b_l^f} \left( \sum_{i \in N_0, j \neq i} \left( \sum_{i \in N_1(i)} \eta_i^l - \sum_{i \in N_1(j)} \eta_i^l \right) \right). \]

\( \sigma^2_{q_2^l} \) is decreasing in \( \rho \) with \( \lim_{\rho \to 1} \sigma^2_{q_2^l} = 0 \). Since
\[ V_D = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2\pi} \sigma^2_{q_2^l} n_D} \] (A.30)
we have \( \frac{\partial V_D}{\partial \rho} < 0 \) and \( \lim_{\rho \to 1} V_D = 0 \).

**Proof of Lemma 3**

The volume traded in the local markets in a fragmented market structure is \( n_D \nu^l \) where
\[ \nu^l = \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E} \left[ \left| \sum_{i \in N_1(l)} x_i^l \right| + |q_1^l| \right]. \]

We know that
\[ x_1^l \sim N \left( 0, \sigma^2_{x_1^l} \right) \]
and \( q_1^l \sim N \left( 0, \sigma^2_{q_1^l} \right) \),

where
\[ \sigma^2_{x_1^l} = \text{Var} \left( x_1^l \right) = \text{Var} \left( -\beta^l (\theta^l - p_1^l) \right) \]
\[ = (\beta^l)^2 \left( \text{Var} \left( \theta^l \right) + \text{Var} \left( p_1^l \right) - 2 \text{Cov} \left( \theta^l, p_1^l \right) \right) \]
\[ = \frac{(\beta^l)^2}{(b^f + n^f \beta^l)^2} \left( (n^f - 1) (\beta^l)^2 + (n^f - 1) (\beta^l)^2 \frac{1 - \rho}{\rho} \right) \sigma^2_{\theta}. \]

Then, since for \( x \sim N \left( 0, \sigma^2 \right) \), \(|x|\) is a folded normal with \( \mathbb{E} [ |x| ] = \sqrt{\frac{2}{\pi}} \sigma \), we have
\[ \nu^l = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \left\{ \frac{n^f \sigma_{x_1} + \sigma_{q_1}}{n^f + n_D} \right\}. \] (A.31)

In a centralized market, volume is given by
\[ \nu_c = \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{n_D} |x_i^c| + n_D |q_1^c| \right]. \]

We know that
\[ x_1^c \sim N \left( 0, \sigma^2_{x_1^c} \right) \]
and \( q_1^c \sim N \left( 0, \sigma^2_{q_1^c} \right) \),
where

\[
\sigma^2_{x_1^k} = \text{Var} (x_1^k) = \text{Var} \left(-\beta^c \left(\theta^k - p_1^k\right)\right)
\]

\[
= (\beta^c)^2 \left(\text{Var} \left(\theta^k\right) + \text{Var} \left(p_1^k\right) - 2\text{Cov} \left(\theta^k, p_1^k\right)\right)
\]

\[
= (\beta^c)^2 \frac{(n_l + n_D)^2}{\rho} + \frac{n_l + \frac{1-\rho}{\rho}(2n_D - n_l)}{(n_l + n_D)^2} \sigma^2_{\theta^c}
\]

and

\[
\sigma^2_{q_1^k} = \text{Var} \left(q_1^k\right) = \text{Var} \left(\beta^c p_1^k\right)
\]

\[
= (\beta^c)^2 \text{Var} \left(p_1^k\right) = (\beta^c)^2 \frac{n_l^2 + n_l \frac{1-\rho}{\rho}}{(n_l + n_D)^2} \sigma^2_{\theta^c}.
\]

Then,

\[
V_c = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \left(\frac{n_l \sigma_{x_1^k} + n_D \sigma_{x_1^k}}{n_l + n_D}\right)
\]

(A.32)

Because \(a^c\), \(b^c\), and \(b^l\) do not depend on \(\rho\), a) and b) follow directly from Equation (A.31) and Equation (A.30), respectively since \(\sigma_{x_1^k}\), \(\sigma_{q_1^k}\), and \(\sigma_{q_2^k}\) are decreasing in \(\rho\). The third claim c) follows from Equation (A.32) since \(\sigma_{x_1^k}\) and \(\sigma_{q_1^k}\) are decreasing in \(\rho\) because \(\beta^c\) does not depend on \(\rho\).

**Characterization of Equilibrium when there is learning from prices**

The equilibrium in the inter-dealer market remains the same as in the baseline model. Therefore, the equilibrium price and quantity traded by dealer \(\ell\) when the dealers’ inventories are \(\{q_1^i\}_{i \in N_D}\) are

\[
p_2 = -\gamma \sum_{i \in N_D} q_1^i \quad \text{and} \quad q_2^\ell = -\frac{1}{\gamma + \lambda_2^\ell} (\gamma q_1^i + p_2),
\]

where \(\lambda_2^\ell\) is the price impact of dealer \(\ell\) in the interdealer market and it is given by \(\lambda_2^\ell = \frac{\gamma}{n_D - 2}\), as in the baseline model.

The expected payoff of participating in the inter-dealer market for dealer \(\ell\) after observing the price in her local market is

\[
V_2^\ell (q_1^\ell, p_1^\ell, s^\ell, m) = \mathbb{E} \left[ -\frac{\gamma}{2} (Q_2^\ell (p_2; q_1^\ell) + q_1^\ell)^2 - p_2 Q_2^\ell (p_2; q_1^\ell) \big| s^\ell, p_1^\ell, q_1^\ell \right],
\]

where the expectation is taken over \(p_2\). Then, the dealer’s problem in her local market \(\ell\) is

\[
\max_{q_1^\ell} V_2^\ell (q_1^\ell, p_1^\ell, s^\ell, m) - p_1^\ell q_1^\ell
\]

A.33 and her first order condition is

\[
\frac{dV_2^\ell}{dq_1^\ell} - p_1^\ell - \frac{\partial p_1^\ell - \ell}{\partial q_1^\ell} q_1^\ell = 0.
\]

Note that

\[
\frac{dV_2^\ell}{dq_2^\ell} = \frac{\partial V_2^\ell}{\partial q_1^\ell} + \frac{\partial V_2^\ell}{\partial q_2^\ell} \frac{dq_2^\ell}{dq_1^\ell} = \frac{\partial V_2^\ell}{\partial q_1^\ell}
\]

since optimality in the dealer’s choice in the interdealer market implies \(\frac{\partial V^\ell}{\partial q_2^\ell} = 0\). Therefore,

\[
\frac{dV_2^\ell}{dq_1^\ell} = -\gamma (q_1^\ell + \mathbb{E} [Q_2^\ell (p_2; q_1^\ell) | s^\ell, p_1^\ell]) - p_1^\ell \frac{\partial p_1^\ell - \ell}{\partial q_1^\ell} q_1^\ell = 0.
\]
Using the expression for $Q_2^\ell$ and that $\lambda_1^\ell = \frac{\partial q_1^\ell}{\partial q_1^\ell}$ this condition can be rewritten as

$$q_1^\ell = \frac{\gamma + \lambda_2^\ell}{\gamma \lambda_2^\ell + \lambda_1^\ell \left( \gamma + \lambda_2^\ell \right)} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + \lambda_2^\ell} \mathbb{E} \left[ p_2 | s^\ell, p_1^\ell \right] - p_1^\ell \right),$$

where $p_2$ is the equilibrium price in the interdealer market. From Equation (A.33) we know that the price $p_2$ is the average quantity with which dealers enter the interdealer market and, therefore, depends on all the information available to each dealer in their local market (their signals and the information contained in the price in their local market), which in turn depends on the price impacts in each local market.

We conjecture and subsequently verify that in an equilibrium in linear strategies $Q_1^\ell \left( p_1^\ell; s^\ell \right) = \tilde{a}^\ell s^\ell + \tilde{b}^\ell p_1^\ell$ and $X_1^\ell \left( p_1^\ell; \theta \right) = \tilde{a}^\ell \theta^i + \tilde{b}^\ell p_1^\ell$, for all $i \in N_I(\ell)$ and for all $\ell \in N_D$. Then, market clearing in local market $\ell$ implies

$$p_1^\ell = -\frac{\tilde{a}^\ell \sum_{i \in N_I(\ell)} \theta^i + \tilde{a}^\ell s^\ell}{n^\ell \tilde{b}^\ell + b^\ell}.$$ 

The price contains information about $\theta$, which is unknown to the dealers. From dealer $\ell$’s perspective, the unbiased signal about $\theta$ that is contained in $p_1^\ell$ is

$$\pi_{\ell}^p = -b^\ell \sum_{i \in N_I(\ell)} \theta^i + \tilde{a}^\ell s^\ell = \bar{\sigma}^\ell = \theta + \sum_{i \in N_I(\ell)} \eta_i n^\ell$$

which has precision

$$\tau_{\ell}^p \equiv \mathbb{V} \mathbb{a}r \left[ \pi_{\ell}^p | \theta, s^\ell \right]^{-1} \equiv n^\ell \sigma_\eta^{-2}.$$ 

Using the equilibrium in the interdealer market and that $\tilde{a}^\ell = -\tilde{b}^\ell$ from the investor’s problem we have

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ Q_2^\ell \left( p_2; q_1^\ell \right) \middle| p_1^\ell \right] = -\frac{n_D-2}{n_D-1} \left( \frac{n_D-1}{n_D} q_1^\ell - \frac{1}{n_D} \sum_{\ell \in N_D, \ell \neq \ell} \frac{n^\ell \tilde{b}^\ell}{n^\ell \tilde{b}^\ell + b^\ell} \left( \tilde{a}^\ell + b^\ell \right) \mathbb{E} \left[ \theta | s^\ell, p_1^\ell \right] \right),$$

where

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \theta | s^\ell, p_1^\ell \right] = \frac{\sigma_\epsilon^{-2} s^\ell + n^\ell \sigma_\eta^{-2} \bar{\sigma}^\ell}{\sigma_\theta^{-2} + \sigma_\epsilon^{-2} + n^\ell \sigma_\eta^{-2}}.$$

Plugging this expression into the first order conditions and matching coefficients, we have that the equilibrium in linear strategies in the local market is characterized by the following system

$$\begin{align*}
\tilde{a}^\ell &= \frac{n_D n^\ell \tilde{b}^\ell}{2 \gamma n^\ell \tilde{b}^\ell - n_D} \left( -\frac{\gamma}{n_D} \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D - 1} \sum_{\ell \in N_D, \ell \neq \ell} \frac{n^\ell \tilde{b}^\ell}{n^\ell \tilde{b}^\ell + b^\ell} \left( \tilde{a}^\ell + b^\ell \right) \frac{\sigma_\epsilon^{-2} s^\ell + n^\ell \sigma_\eta^{-2} \bar{\sigma}^\ell}{\sigma_\theta^{-2} + \sigma_\epsilon^{-2} + n^\ell \sigma_\eta^{-2}} \right) \\
\tilde{b}^\ell &= \frac{n_D n^\ell \tilde{b}^\ell}{2 \gamma n^\ell \tilde{b}^\ell - n_D} \left( -\frac{\gamma}{n_D} \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D - 1} \sum_{\ell \in N_D, \ell \neq \ell} \left( a^\ell + b^\ell \right) \frac{n^\ell \tilde{b}^\ell}{n^\ell \tilde{b}^\ell + b^\ell} \frac{\sigma_\epsilon^{-2} s^\ell + n^\ell \sigma_\eta^{-2} \bar{\sigma}^\ell}{\sigma_\theta^{-2} + \sigma_\epsilon^{-2} + n^\ell \sigma_\eta^{-2}} \right) \\
\bar{\sigma}^\ell &= -\frac{\tilde{a}^\ell}{\gamma \left( n^\ell - 1 \right) \tilde{b}^\ell + b^\ell} - 1
\end{align*}$$

(A.34)

for all $\ell$. Note that when $\sigma_\eta^2 = 0$, the system in Equations (A.34) is the same as the one in Equations (A.6) in the baseline model. Finally, note that

$$\lambda_1^\ell = \frac{1}{n^\ell \tilde{b}^\ell} \quad \text{and} \quad \nu_1^\ell = \frac{1}{(n^\ell - 1) \tilde{b}^\ell + b^\ell}.$$
Proof of Proposition 7

Throughout this proof, we set \( n_I = n_D \) and keep \( n_S \) fixed. The expected utility of an investor \( i \) from participating in the local market \( \ell \) when the market structure is \( \ell \) and there is learning from prices is

\[
\hat{V}_i^\ell (m) = \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} + \tilde{p}_i^\ell \right) \left( \frac{1}{\gamma + \tilde{p}_i^\ell} \right)^2 E \left[ (\theta^i - p_i^\ell)^2 \right]
\]

\[
= \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} + \tilde{p}_i^\ell \right) \left( \frac{1}{\gamma + \tilde{p}_i^\ell} \right)^2 E \left[ \left( \theta^i - \frac{n^i \tilde{\beta}^\ell \sum_{n_i} \theta^i - \bar{a}^\ell s^i}{n^i \tilde{\beta}^\ell + b^\ell} \right)^2 \right],
\]

where \( \tilde{p}_i^\ell \) is the price impact of an investor in local market \( \ell \) in a symmetric equilibrium of the trading game, which satisfies

\[
\tilde{\beta}^\ell = -\frac{1}{\gamma + \tilde{p}_i^\ell}.
\]

Let \( m_S \) be a symmetric market structure. Then, we define \( \tilde{\Delta}^i (\rho; n_D) \) as investor \( i \)'s payoff from not deviating from market structure \( m_S \), i.e.,

\[
\tilde{\Delta}^i (\rho; n_D) = \hat{V}_i^l (m) - \hat{V}_i^l (m_S - i \ell + i \ell').
\]

Note that because \( \tilde{\Delta}^i \) is continuous in the parameters \( \tilde{a}^\ell, b^\ell \), and \( \beta^\ell \), and for all \( \rho < 1 \), we have that \( \lim_{\sigma_2 \to 0} \tilde{a}^\ell = a^\ell \), \( \lim_{\sigma_2 \to 0} b^\ell = b^\ell \), and \( \lim_{\sigma_2 \to 0} \beta^\ell = \beta^\ell \)

\[
\lim_{\sigma_2 \to 0} \tilde{\Delta}^i (\rho; n_D, \sigma_2^2) = \Delta^i (\rho; n_D).
\]

When \( \rho = 1 \),

\[
\lim_{\sigma_2 \to 0} \tilde{\Delta}^i (\rho = 1; n_D, \sigma_2^2) \neq \Delta^i (\rho = 1; n_D),
\]
as investors will disregard their signal when the price is fully revealing. Therefore, we will consider the cases for \( \sigma_2^2 > 0 \) below and refer to Theorem 1 for the case in which \( \sigma_2^2 = 0 \).

Theorem 1 implies that when \( n_D = 3 \) there exists \( \rho^* (n_D = 3) < 1 \) such that

\[
\Delta^i (\rho; n_D = 3) > 0 \iff \rho \geq \rho^* (n_D = 3).
\]

Since \( \lim_{\sigma_2 \to 0} \tilde{\Delta}^i (\rho; n_D, \sigma_2^2) = \Delta^i (\rho; n_D) \) for all \( \rho < 1 \), there exists a threshold \( \bar{\sigma}_2 \) such that

\[
\tilde{\Delta}^i (\rho; n_D = 3, \sigma_2^2) > 0 \quad \text{if} \quad 1 > \rho \geq \rho^* (n_D = 3, \sigma_2^2) \quad \forall \sigma_2^2 \in (0, \bar{\sigma}_2),
\]

where \( \rho^* (n_D = 3, \sigma_2^2) < 1 \). Note that \( \Delta^i (\rho; n_D = 3, \sigma_2^2) \), is continuous in \( \rho \). Then

\[
\lim_{\rho \to 1} \tilde{\Delta}^i (\rho; n_D = 3, \sigma_2^2) > 0 \quad \forall \sigma_2^2 \in (0, \bar{\sigma}_2),
\]

Moreover, note that \( \lim_{\rho \to 1} \tilde{\Delta}^i (\rho; n_D = 3, \sigma_2^2) \) is independent of \( \sigma_2^2 \) for all \( \sigma_2^2 > 0 \). Therefore, we have that

\[
\lim_{\rho \to 1} \tilde{\Delta}^i (\rho; n_D = 3, \sigma_2^2) > 0 \quad \forall \sigma_2^2 > 0.
\]

Since \( \lim_{\rho \to 1} \tilde{\Delta}^i (\rho; n_D, \sigma_2^2) \) is continuous in \( n_D \) when \( \sigma_2^2 > 0 \), it follows that there exists a threshold \( \tilde{\rho} (n_D, \sigma_2^2) \) such that

\[
\lim_{\rho \to 1} \tilde{\Delta}^i (\rho; n_D, \sigma_2^2) > 0 \quad \forall n_D < \tilde{\rho} (n_D, \sigma_2^2), \forall \sigma_2^2 > 0,
\]

Using that \( \tilde{\Delta}^i (\rho; n_D, \sigma_2^2) \) is continuous in \( \rho \) for all \( \sigma_2^2 > 0 \) we have that there exists a threshold \( \tilde{\rho} \) such that

\[
\tilde{\Delta}^i (\rho; n_D, \sigma_2^2) > 0 \quad \forall \rho > \tilde{\rho} (n_D, \sigma_2^2), \forall n_D < \tilde{\rho} (n_D, \sigma_2^2), \forall \sigma_2^2 > 0,
\]

which proves the result for \( \sigma_2^2 > 0 \). Theorem 1 proves the result for the case in which \( \sigma_2^2 = 0 \).
B Disagreement and fragmentation in equity markets

Our model suggests that an important feature in determining whether an asset is traded in a fragmented market is the disagreement between investors about the value of the asset. More specifically, our results imply that assets for which there is less disagreement are more likely to be traded in fragmented markets.

We investigate the relation between disagreement and market fragmentation, using data from equity markets. Typically, equity trading is not intermediated through interdealer markets. However, as Proposition 4 shows, in our model fragmentation can be supported in equilibrium even in the absence of an interdealer market provided there is little disagreement between investors. Thus, our results on market fragmentation can be applied to the context of equity markets.

We use three databases to explore the relation between disagreement and market fragmentation. We get analysts’ price forecasts from IBES price target data, the total number of shares traded in exchanges from CRSP, and the total number of shares traded in ATS from FINRA ATS. After merging the three databases we are left with $10,534$ stock-month observations. The average number of monthly forecasts is close to 8.27. On average, disagreement is close to 11% of the average price.

We construct our measure of fragmentation similarly to O’Hara and Ye (2011). As a proxy for market fragmentation, we use the fraction of shares of a given stock that is traded in ATS out of the total shares of the stocks traded in a given month. The FINRA ATS data is reported at a weekly frequency. We aggregate all shares across all ATS for each week and then across all weeks in a month to get the monthly shares of each stock traded in ATS which we label $\#TotalShares_{ATS}^{XYZ}$ for stock XYZ. We obtain the number of shares traded in the main exchanges in a month from CRSP by aggregating the daily number of shares sold at the CUSIP
We label this amount \( \#TotalShares^{XY}{_{nonATS}} \) for stock XYZ. Our measure of fragmentation is given by

\[
\text{Fragmentation} = \frac{\#TotalShares^{XYZ}_{ATS}}{\#TotalShares^{XYZ}_{ATS} + \#TotalShares^{XYS}_{nonATS}}.
\]

We measure disagreement as the standard deviation in analyst forecasts for a particular stock normalized by the average of the forecast prices to control for the differences in the scale of stock prices. We label this measure \( DISP^{XYZ} \) for stock XYZ. We use the CUSIP identifier from CRSP to download the corresponding IBES price target data. The IBES price target data reports analysts’ forecasts of each stock price. We focus on forecasts with 12 month horizons on their announcement dates. Using the IBES foreign exchange data we convert all forecasts to USD. Then, for each stock XYZ with more than three forecasts within a month, we compute our measure of disagreement by taking the standard deviation of those forecasts normalized by the average of the forecast prices, as in Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002), Yu (2011), and Hong and Sraer (2016). More specifically, we measure disagreement as the standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts normalized by the average analyst forecast for that stock in a given month. We have included only stocks for which we have more than three analyst forecasts. As a proxy for market fragmentation, we use the fraction of shares of a given stock that is traded in alternative trading systems (ATS) out of the total shares of the stocks traded in a given month. FINRA provides data about how many shares for each stock are traded in ATS, and we get the number of shares for each stock that is traded in main exchanges (NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX) from CRSP. Our measure of fragmentation is similar to the one used by O’Hara and Ye (2011). A more detailed description of the data and sample construction can be found in the Appendix.

Figure A1 shows, in a bin-scatter plot, the relation between our measure of disagreement, on the x-axis, and our measure of market fragmentation, on the y-axis, in 2016. We find a negative correlation between disagreement and market fragmentation.\footnote{Figure A1 is constructed using data winsorized at 5% and 95%. The negative correlation is robust to winsorizations at 2.5% and 1%, and to using unwinsorized data.} This finding is consistent with our model’s prediction in Section 4. In our model, the degree of market fragmentation is negatively associated with the level of disagreement between investors. A first look at the data suggests that the mechanism highlighted in our model is plausible and hints towards the importance of strategic trading in determining fragmented market structures. A more thorough analysis of the empirical relation between the degree of market fragmentation and disagreement, though interesting, is left for future work.
C  Online Appendix (not for publication)

This section contains intermediate results used in the main appendix.

Lemma 18. In a symmetric equilibrium

\[
a^{\text{sym}} = -n^{\ell 2} \beta^{\text{sym}} \gamma - \frac{n^{\ell}}{n^{\ell} \beta^{\text{sym}}} - \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D - 2n^{\ell} \beta^{\text{sym}}},
\]

(C.1)

where

\[
\lim_{n_D \to \infty} a^{\text{sym}} = \frac{\gamma}{2} - \gamma n^{\ell}, \quad \lim_{n^{\ell} \to \infty} a^{\text{sym}} = \lim_{n^{\ell} \to \infty} -b^{\text{sym}}
\]

and

\[
\lim_{n_D \to 3} a^{\text{sym}} = \frac{1}{3} n^{\ell} (b^{\text{sym}})^2 \gamma n^{\ell}.
\]

If one investor deviates from a fragmented symmetric market structure then

\[
\lim_{n_D \to \infty} \left[ a^\ell \choose a^h \choose a^o \right] = \begin{bmatrix}
b^\ell \gamma (5b^\ell \gamma + 12) \\
b^h \gamma (5b^h \gamma + 12) \\
b^o \gamma (5b^o \gamma + 12)
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

Proof. In a symmetric equilibrium

\[
a^{\text{sym}} = \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} b^{\text{sym}} n^{\ell} a^{\text{sym}} + b^{\text{sym}} n^{\ell} b^{\text{sym}} \gamma^{\text{sym}}
\]

or, alternatively,

\[
a^{\text{sym}} = \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \left( b^{\text{sym}} n^{\ell} + b^{\text{sym}} n^{\ell} \gamma^{\text{sym}} \right)
\]

where

\[
b^{\text{sym}} = \frac{n_D - 2}{2n_D} \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} b^{\text{sym}} n^{\ell} \gamma^{\text{sym}} - n^{\ell} n^{\ell} \gamma^{\text{sym}}
\]

and \( \beta^{\text{sym}} = \beta (n^{\ell}) \). Then,

\[
\lim_{n_D \to \infty} a^{\text{sym}} = \lim_{n^{\ell} \to \infty} \frac{\gamma}{2} - \gamma n^{\ell} = \frac{n_D}{2} \gamma
\]

\[
\lim_{n^{\ell} \to \infty} a^{\text{sym}} = \frac{1}{3} (b^{\text{sym}})^2 \gamma n^{\ell} \beta^{\text{sym}}
\]

A24
Using that
\[ n^\ell \beta^\sym = \frac{3\gamma^\sym}{2\gamma^\sym + 3} \]
\[ \lim_{n^\ell \to 3} \alpha^\sym = \frac{(b^\sym)^2 \gamma}{3 + (1 - \frac{1}{3} n^\ell) (2\gamma b^\sym + 3)} = \frac{(b^\sym)^2 \gamma}{6 + (1 - \frac{1}{3} n^\ell) 2\gamma b^\sym - n^\ell} \]

If the investor chooses to deviate, the market structure is as follows: market \( \ell \) has \( n^\ell + 1 \) investors, market \( h \) has \( n^h \) investors, and the rest of the \( n_D - 2 \) markets have \( n^\ell \) investors. Then,
\[ a^\ell = b^\ell \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) \frac{1}{n_D - 1} \left( (n_D - 2) n^\ell \frac{a^o + b^o}{n^\ell \beta^o + b^o \beta^o} + (n^\ell + 1) \frac{a^h + b^h}{(n^\ell + 1) \beta^h + b^h \beta^h} \right) \]
\[ a^h = b^h \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) \frac{1}{n_D - 1} \left( (n_D - 2) n^\ell \frac{a^o + b^o}{n^\ell \beta^o + b^o \beta^o} + (n^\ell - 1) \frac{a^h + b^h}{(n^\ell - 1) \beta^h + b^h \beta^h} \right) \]
\[ a^o = b^o \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) \frac{1}{n_D - 1} \left( (n_D - 3) n^\ell \frac{a^o + b^o}{n^\ell \beta^o + b^o \beta^o} + (n^\ell - 1) \frac{a^h + b^h}{(n^\ell - 1) \beta^h + b^h \beta^h} \right) \]

One can rewrite this system as
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
    a^\ell \\
a^h \\
a^o
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
    \Omega_{11} & \Omega_{12} & \Omega_{13} \\
    \Omega_{21} & \Omega_{22} & \Omega_{23} \\
    \Omega_{31} & \Omega_{32} & \Omega_{33}
\end{bmatrix}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix}
    c_1 \\
c_2 \\
c_3
\end{bmatrix}
\]

where
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
    \Omega_{11} & \Omega_{12} & \Omega_{13} \\
    \Omega_{21} & \Omega_{22} & \Omega_{23} \\
    \Omega_{31} & \Omega_{32} & \Omega_{33}
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
    \frac{b^h \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right)}{n_D - 1} & \frac{b^h \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) b^\ell}{n_D - 1} & \frac{b^h \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) b^\ell}{n_D - 1} \\
    \frac{b^o \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right)}{n_D - 1} & \frac{b^o \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) b^\ell}{n_D - 1} & \frac{b^o \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) b^\ell}{n_D - 1} \\
    \frac{b^o \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right)}{n_D - 1} & \frac{b^o \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) b^\ell}{n_D - 1} & \frac{b^o \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) b^\ell}{n_D - 1}
\end{bmatrix}
\]

and
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
    c_1 \\
c_2 \\
c_3
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
    \frac{b^h \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) b^\ell}{n_D - 1} & \frac{b^h \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) b^\ell}{n_D - 1} & \frac{b^h \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) b^\ell}{n_D - 1} \\
    \frac{b^o \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) b^\ell}{n_D - 1} & \frac{b^o \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) b^\ell}{n_D - 1} & \frac{b^o \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) b^\ell}{n_D - 1} \\
    \frac{b^o \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) b^\ell}{n_D - 1} & \frac{b^o \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) b^\ell}{n_D - 1} & \frac{b^o \gamma \left( \frac{n_D - 2}{n_D} \right) b^\ell}{n_D - 1}
\end{bmatrix}
\]

Then,
\[
\lim_{n_D \to \infty} \begin{bmatrix}
    a^\ell \\
a^h \\
a^o
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
    \Omega_{11} & \Omega_{12} & \Omega_{13} \\
    \Omega_{21} & \Omega_{22} & \Omega_{23} \\
    \Omega_{31} & \Omega_{32} & \Omega_{33}
\end{bmatrix}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix}
    c_1 \\
c_2 \\
c_3
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
    \frac{2 (n^\ell + 1) b^\ell}{n^\ell b^\ell + b^o \beta^o} \\
    \frac{2 (n^\ell + 1) b^\ell}{n^\ell b^\ell + b^o \beta^o} \\
    \frac{2 (n^\ell + 1) b^\ell}{n^\ell b^\ell + b^o \beta^o}
\end{bmatrix}
\]

A25
When \( n_D \to 3 \), we have

\[
\lim_{n_D \to 3} \begin{bmatrix} a^\ell & a^h \\ a^h & a^o \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} I_3 & \lim_{n_D \to 3} \begin{bmatrix} \Omega_{11} & \Omega_{12} & \Omega_{13} \\ \Omega_{21} & \Omega_{22} & \Omega_{23} \\ \Omega_{31} & \Omega_{32} & \Omega_{33} \end{bmatrix} \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} c_1 \\ c_2 \\ c_3 \end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
= \begin{bmatrix} b^\ell \gamma (5b^\ell \gamma + 12) \\ b^h \gamma (5b^h \gamma + 12) \\ b^o \gamma (5b^o \gamma + 12) \end{bmatrix}
\]

where we used that

\[
n_\beta (n) = \frac{3b(n)}{2\gamma b(n) + 3}.
\]

**Lemma 19.** Let

\[
F(n) = -\frac{(4n + 3) \gamma b(n) + 6n + 3\gamma b(n)}{n(\gamma b(n) + 6)^2} b(n).
\]

Then, \( F(n) > 0 \) for all \( n \geq 0 \) and \( F'(n) < 0 \).

**Proof.** First, note that \( b(n) = \frac{3n\beta(n)}{3 - 2n\gamma\beta(n)} \). Equation (C.3) becomes

\[
(4n + 3) \gamma n_\beta (n) + 6n (3 - 2n\gamma \beta(n)) = 9n (\gamma \beta(n) + 2) > 0
\]

since \( \beta(n) \geq -\frac{1}{7} \). The derivative of \( F(\cdot) \) with respect to \( n \) is

\[
F'(n) = \frac{3}{n(\gamma b(n) + 6)^2} \left( \frac{\gamma b(n)^2}{n} - \frac{2}{(\gamma b(n) + 6)} (6n + 6\gamma b(n)\gamma + 7b(n)\gamma n b) \partial b(n) \partial n \right).
\]

Then, using that \( b(n) = \frac{3n\beta(n)}{3 - 2n\gamma\beta(n)} \) we have

\[
\frac{\partial b(n)}{\partial n} = \frac{9}{(2n\gamma\beta(n) - 3)^2} \left( \beta(n) + 9n \frac{\partial \beta(n)}{\partial n} \right)
\]

and

\[
F'(n) = \frac{n}{3n^2 (n\gamma\beta(n) - 2)^2} \left( (\beta(n) + 2)(n\beta(n) + 2)\beta(n) + 18n ((n + 2)\gamma \beta(n) + 2) \frac{\partial \beta(n)}{\partial n} \right).
\]

From Lemma 6 we know \( \beta(n) \geq -\frac{1}{7} \) and thus \( (\beta(n) + 2) > 0 \). Moreover, \( n\beta(n) + 2 < 0 \) since

\[
H \left( \frac{2}{n\gamma}; n_D = 3 \right) = \frac{2}{n} (5n^2 - 17n + 7) > 0 \text{ for } n \geq 3.
\]

Then, \( (n + 2)\gamma \beta(n) + 2 < 0 \) and \( F'(n) < 0 \).

**Lemma 20.** We show that

\[
\frac{\gamma b_{\text{dev}} + 6}{2\gamma b_{\text{dev}} + 6} \left( 1 + \frac{a_{\text{dev}}}{b_{\text{dev}}} \right) = \frac{(\gamma b_{\text{dev}} + 6)(\gamma b_{\text{dev}} + 12)}{288\gamma b_{\text{dev}} + 288\gamma b_{\text{dev}} + 288\gamma b_{\text{dev}} + 90\gamma b_{\text{dev}}^2 + 90\gamma b_{\text{dev}}^2 + 90\gamma b_{\text{dev}}^2 + 90\gamma b_{\text{dev}}^2 + 25\gamma b_{\text{dev}}^2 + b_{\text{dev}}^2 + 864}.
\]

**Proof.** Using Lemma 18 we have

\[
\frac{(\gamma b_{\text{dev}} + 6)}{(2\gamma b_{\text{dev}} + 6)} \left( 1 + \frac{a_{\text{dev}}}{b_{\text{dev}}} \right) = \frac{288\gamma b_{\text{dev}} + 288\gamma b_{\text{dev}} + 288\gamma b_{\text{dev}} + 90\gamma b_{\text{dev}} + 90\gamma b_{\text{dev}} + 90\gamma b_{\text{dev}} + 90\gamma b_{\text{dev}} + 25\gamma b_{\text{dev}}^2 + b_{\text{dev}}^2 + 864}.
\]

A26
Then, showing Equation (C.4) holds is the same as showing that

$$\left( \frac{288\gamma b^{syym} + 288\gamma b^{dev} + 288\gamma b^{syym} b^{dev} + 90^2 b^{syym} b^{dev} + 90^2 b^{dev} b^{syym} + 25\gamma b^{syym} b^{dev} b^{dev} + 864}{(\gamma b^{dev} + 6)(\gamma b^{syym} + 12)(\gamma b^{dev} + 12)} \right)^2 > \frac{n^\ell}{n^\ell + 1}$$

$$\left( -6\gamma \frac{(b^\ell - b^{dev})}{(\gamma b^{dev} + 6)(5\gamma b^{dev} + 12)} - 6\gamma \frac{(b^{syym} - b^{dev})}{(5b^{syym} \gamma + 12)(\gamma b^{dev} + 6)} + 1 \right)^2 > \frac{n^\ell}{n^\ell + 1}$$

$$(-G \left( b^\ell; b^{dev} \right) - G \left( b^{syym}; b^{dev} \right) + 1)^2 > \frac{n^\ell}{n^\ell + 1}, \quad \text{(C.5)}$$

where

$$G \left( x; b^{dev} \right) = 6\gamma \frac{(x - b^{dev})}{(\gamma b^{dev} + 6)(5\gamma x + 12)}.$$  \hspace{1cm} \text{(C.6)}$$

Because

$$b(n) = \frac{3n\beta(n)}{3 - 2\gamma n\beta(n)},$$

we have

$$\frac{5\gamma b(n) + 12}{\gamma b(n) + 6} = \frac{\beta(n) \gamma (n + 1) - 4}{\beta(n) \gamma (n + 1) - 2} > 0,$$

which implies

$$G'(x) = \frac{5\gamma b^{dev} + 12}{(\gamma b^{syym} + 6)(5\gamma x + 12)^2} > 0$$

and $G \left( x, b^{dev} \right) > 0$ for $x > b^{dev}$ since $G \left( b^{dev}; b^{dev} \right) = 0$. Then, since $G \left( b^\ell; b^{dev} \right) > G \left( b^{syym}; b^{dev} \right)$, if

$$2G \left( b^\ell; b^{dev} \right) = 12\gamma \frac{b^\ell - b^{dev}}{(5b^\ell \gamma + 12)(\gamma b^{dev} + 6)} < 1 - \sqrt{\frac{n^\ell}{n^\ell + 1}}, \quad \text{(C.7)}$$

Equation (C.5) holds. Using that $\gamma b^{dev} \in (-1, 0)$ and Equation (C.6) we have

$$b(n) > -\frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{3n}{3 + 2n}.$$  \hspace{1cm} \text{(C.8)}$$

Because the left hand side of Equation (C.7) is decreasing in $b^{dev}$ we can rewrite Equation (C.7) as

$$\frac{4(2n^\ell + 5)\gamma b^\ell + 3(n + 1)}{3(5b^\ell \gamma + 12)(n + 3)} < 1 - \sqrt{\frac{n^\ell}{n^\ell + 1}}$$

$$\gamma b^\ell < \frac{4(2n^\ell + 5) + 15\sqrt{\frac{n^\ell}{n^\ell + 1}} - 1}{12\left( n^\ell + 1 + 3 \left( \sqrt{\frac{n^\ell}{n^\ell + 1}} - 1 \right) (n^\ell + 3) \right)} (n^\ell + 3)$$

since $4 \left( 2n^\ell + 5 \right) + 15 \left( \sqrt{\frac{n^\ell}{n^\ell + 1}} - 1 \right) (n^\ell + 3) > 0$. Using Equation (C.6) this becomes

$$\frac{3(n^\ell - 1)\gamma b^\ell}{(3 - 2\gamma(n^\ell - 1)b^\ell)} < \frac{-12\left( n^\ell + 1 + 3 \left( \sqrt{\frac{n^\ell}{n^\ell + 1}} - 1 \right) (n^\ell + 3) \right)}{4(2n^\ell + 5) + 15\sqrt{\frac{n^\ell}{n^\ell + 1}} - 1} (n^\ell + 3)$$

$$\gamma b^\ell < \frac{4 \left( -2(n^\ell + 4) + 3(3 + n^\ell) \sqrt{\frac{n^\ell}{n^\ell + 1}} \right)}{(n^\ell - 1) \left( -3n^\ell - 13 + 3(n^\ell) \sqrt{\frac{n^\ell}{n^\ell + 1}} \right)} \equiv Z$$

which holds because

$$H \left( \frac{Z}{\gamma}; n = n^\ell - 1, n_D = 3 \right) = -2 \left( n^\ell - 1 \right) \left( n^\ell - 2 \right) Z^2 + 3 \left( 2n^\ell - 3 \right) + 2 \left( n^\ell - 1 \right) - 2 \left( n^\ell - 1 \right) \left( n^\ell - 2 \right) \right) Z + 6 \left( n^\ell - 2 \right) > 0$$

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for all \( n^\ell > 2 \). Indeed, it is simple to check that
\[
(n^\ell + 3) (n^\ell + 1) \left( -56n^\ell - 8 (n^\ell)^2 + (n^\ell)^3 - 19 \right) > 0,
\]
for \( n^\ell \geq 3 \). This implies that
\[
6\sqrt{\frac{n^\ell}{n^\ell + 1}} (n^\ell + 3) (n^\ell + 1) \left( -56n^\ell - 8 (n^\ell)^2 + (n^\ell)^3 - 19 \right) > 6\frac{n^\ell}{n^\ell + 1} (n^\ell + 3) (n^\ell + 1) \left( -56n^\ell - 8 (n^\ell)^2 + (n^\ell)^3 - 19 \right),
\]
and further
\[
949n^\ell + 1313 (n^\ell)^2 + 489 (n^\ell)^3 + 33 (n^\ell)^4 + 3n^\ell - 6 (n^\ell)^5 - 58 + 6\sqrt{\frac{n^\ell}{n^\ell + 1}} (n^\ell + 3) (n^\ell + 1) \left( -56n^\ell - 8 (n^\ell)^2 + (n^\ell)^3 - 19 \right)
\]
\[
> 3 (n^\ell)^4 + 9 (n^\ell)^3 + 191 (n^\ell)^2 + 607n^\ell - 58,
\]
for \( n^\ell \geq 13 \).

This shows that \( H \left( \frac{Z}{\gamma}; n = n^\ell - 1, n_D = 3 \right) > 0 \) for \( n^\ell \geq 13 \). For \( 3 \leq n^\ell \leq 12 \) we show that \( H \left( \frac{Z}{\gamma}; n = n^\ell - 1, n_D = 3 \right) > 0 \) point by point. \( \square \)

**Lemma 21.** We show that
\[
\frac{d}{dn} \left( -\frac{1}{2} \beta (n) (\gamma \beta (n) + 2) \right) = \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \left( -\frac{1}{2} \beta (n) (\gamma \beta (n) + 2) \right) \frac{\partial \beta}{\partial n} > 0.
\]

**Proof.**
\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \left( -\frac{1}{2} \beta (n) (\gamma \beta (n) + 2) \right) = -\beta (n) \gamma - 1 < 0
\]

since
\[
H \left( \frac{1}{\gamma} \right) = -2 (n - 1) n - ((2n - 1) n_D - (n - 2) 2n) + 2 (n - 1) n_D
\]
\[
= -2n - n_D < 0,
\]
\[
\beta (n) > -\frac{1}{\gamma}
\]

\( \square \)

**Lemma 22.** We show that
\[
n_D + 2n^2 \gamma \frac{\partial \beta (n)}{\partial n} > 0.
\]

**Proof.** Using the definition of \( \frac{\partial \beta (n)}{\partial n} \)
\[
n_D (-4 (n - 1) n \gamma \beta (n) + ((2n - 1) n_D - (n - 2) 2n)) - 2n^2 \left( -\gamma^2 \beta (n)^2 (2n - 1) - \gamma \beta (n) (2 (n - 1) - n_D) + n_D \right) < 0
\]
\[
4n^2 (2n - 1) \gamma^2 \beta (n)^2 + (-4n^2 (n_D - 2n + 2) - 4nn_D (n - 1)) \gamma \beta (n) + (n_D (n_D (2n - 1) - 2n (n - 2)) - 4n^2 n_D) < 0
\]

Using the definition of \( \beta (n)^2 \)
\[
(2n^2 + (2n - 1) n_D) \frac{n - 1}{n_D} n_D + 2 \gamma \beta (n) n_D > 0
\]
since we show below in Lemma 24 that
\[
((n - 1) n_D + 2 \gamma \beta (n) n) > 0.
\]

\( \square \)
Lemma 23. We show that \( \frac{\beta(n) b(n)}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))^2} \) is decreasing in \( n \).

Proof. We have that

\[
\frac{\beta(n) b(n)}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))^2} = \frac{\beta(n)}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))} \frac{b(n)}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))}
\]

Then,

\[
\frac{d}{dn} \left( \frac{\beta(n) b(n)}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))^2} \right) = \frac{d}{dn} \left( \frac{\beta(n)}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))} \right) \frac{b(n)}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))} + \frac{\beta(n)}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))} \frac{d}{dn} \left( \frac{b(n)}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))} \right)
\]

From Lemma 25 and Lemma 24 we know that

\[
\frac{d}{dn} \left( \frac{\beta(n)}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))} \right) < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{d}{dn} \left( \frac{b(n)}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))} \right) < 0
\]

Since \( b(n) < 0 \) and \( \beta(n) < 0 \) the result follows.

Lemma 24. We show that

\[
\frac{d}{dn} \left( \frac{\beta(n)}{b(n)+n\beta(n)} \right) < 0.
\]

Proof. We have that

\[
\frac{d}{dn} \left( \frac{\beta(n)}{b(n)+n\beta(n)} \right) = \frac{\partial}{\partial n} \left( \frac{\beta(n)}{b(n)+n\beta(n)} \right) + \frac{\partial}{\partial b(n)} \left( \frac{\beta(n)}{b(n)+n\beta(n)} \right) \frac{db(n)}{dn} + \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta(n)} \left( \frac{\beta(n)}{b(n)+n\beta(n)} \right) \frac{d\beta(n)}{dn},
\]

where

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial n} \left( \frac{\beta(n)}{b(n)+n\beta(n)} \right) = -\frac{\beta(n)^2}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))^2} < 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial b(n)} \left( \frac{\beta(n)}{b(n)+n\beta(n)} \right) = -\frac{\beta(n)}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))^2} > 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial \beta(n)} \left( \frac{\beta(n)}{b(n)+n\beta(n)} \right) = \frac{b(n)}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))^2} < 0.
\]

Then,

\[
\frac{d}{dn} \left( \frac{\beta(n)}{b(n)+n\beta(n)} \right) = \frac{\beta(n)^2}{(b(n)+n\beta(n))^2} \left( (-2\gamma n^2 n_D) \frac{\partial \beta(n)}{\partial n} - (n_D - 2\gamma \beta(n) n)^2 + n_D^2 \right),
\]

where

\[
2\gamma n^2 n_D \frac{\partial \beta(n)}{\partial n} + \left( n_D - 2\gamma \beta(n) n \right)^2 + n_D^2 > 0. \tag{C.8}
\]

To see this note that using

\[
\frac{\partial \beta(n)}{\partial n} = -\frac{2 \left( -\beta(n)^2 \gamma^2 (2n-1) - \beta \gamma (2(n-1) - n_D) + n_D \right)}{\beta(n)^2 (n_D-2\gamma \beta(n)n)^2 - 4(n-1)n\gamma^2 \beta + ((2n-1)n_D - (n-2)2n) \gamma}
\]

Equation (C.8) becomes

\[
(n_D - 2\gamma \beta(n) n)^2 + n_D \left( -\frac{2 \left( -\gamma^2 \beta(n)^2 (2n-1) - \gamma \beta(n) (2(n-1) - n_D) + n_D \right)}{\beta(n)^2 (n_D-2\gamma \beta(n)n)^2 - 4(n-1)n\gamma^2 \beta + ((2n-1)n_D - (n-2)2n) \gamma} \right) + n_D^2 > 0
\]
The first term is positive. The last two terms can be written as \( n_D J (\beta (n)) \) where

\[
J (\beta (n)) := 2n^2 \left( -\frac{2 \left( -\gamma^2 \beta (n)^2 (2n - 1) - \gamma \beta (n) (2 (n - 1) - n_D) + n_D \right)}{4 (n - 1) n \gamma \beta (n) + ((2n - 1) n_D - (n - 2) 2n)} \right) + n_D > 0
\]

Rearranging terms

\[
J (\beta (n)) = \frac{(4\gamma^2 n^2 - 8\gamma^2 n^3 + 8\gamma n^2 n_D - 4\gamma n n_D) \beta + (1 - 2n)n_D^2 + (6n^2 - 4n)n_D}{(-4(n - 1)n \gamma \beta + ((2n - 1)n_D - (n - 2) 2n))}
\]

The denominator is negative. Substituting \((\beta (n))^2\), the numerator can be written as

\[
-\frac{1}{n - 1} ((n - 1) n_D + 2\beta (n) \gamma n) (2n^2 + (2n - 1) n_D) < 0
\]

since

\[
((n - 1) n_D + 2\beta (n) \gamma n) > 0
\]

\[
\gamma \beta (n) > -\frac{(n - 1) n_D}{2n}
\]

because

\[
H \left( -\frac{(n - 1) n_D}{2n} \right) = -\frac{1}{2} n_D n (n - 1) (n_D - 2) < 0.
\]

Then, \( n_D J (\beta (n)) > 0 \) and Equation (C.8) holds.

**Lemma 25.** We show that

\[
\frac{d}{dn} \left( \frac{b(n)}{b(n) + n \beta (n)} \right) < 0.
\]

**Proof.** Using the definition of \( b(n) \) we have

\[
\frac{b(n)}{b(n) + n \beta (n)} = \frac{\frac{n n_D \beta (n)}{n_D - 2n \gamma \beta (n)}}{n_D - 2n \gamma \beta (n)} + n \beta (n) = \frac{n_D}{2 (n_D - n \gamma \beta (n))}
\]

Then,

\[
\frac{d}{dn} \left( \frac{b(n)}{b(n) + n \beta (n)} \right) = \frac{\frac{n_D}{2 (n_D - n \gamma \beta (n))}}{\left( \frac{n_D}{2 (n_D - n \gamma \beta (n))} + 1 \right)^2} \left( \frac{d(n \beta (n))}{dn} \right)
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{2} \gamma \frac{n_D}{(n_D - n \gamma \beta (n))^2} \left( n \frac{\partial \beta (n)}{\partial n} + \beta (n) \right) < 0.
\]

□